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I. INTRODUCTION
[It] is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is
the idea only. An idea at the back of it: not a sentimental pretence but an
idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea - something you can set up, and
bow down to, and offer a sacrifice to ....
-Joseph Conrad1
A. The Explosion in "Rule of Law" Promotion
The past decade has seen a surge in American and international ef-
forts to promote "the rule of law" around the globe, especially in post-
crisis and transitional societies.2 The World Bank and multinational
corporations want the rule of law, since the sanctity of private prop-
erty and the enforcement of contracts are critical to modern concep-
tions of the free market.' Human-rights advocates want the rule of law
since due process and judicial checks on executive power are regarded
as essential prerequisites to the protection of substantive human
rights.' In the wake of September 11, international and national-
1. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 4 (Dover 1990) (1902).
2. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at
95 [hereinafter Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival] ("One cannot get through a foreign
policy debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the
world's troubles."); cf PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 4 (1999).
When we look ... at recent developments in Eastern Europe and Latin America, we speak
of the progressive transition from dictatorial systems to the rule of law. We measure their
progress - or lack of it - against our end. When we observe third world countries, we see
the absence of law's rule as a pathological condition. We have a missionary zeal, believing
our truth to be revealed truth.... Not to see the end of social order as the rule of law strikes
us as unnatural ....
Id. (citation omitted).
3. See, e.g., JOHN HEWKO, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: DOES THE RULE OF LAW
MATTER? 3 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper, Rule of Law Series No.
26, Apr. 2002) (noting that "[t]he conventional wisdom within the international development
community is that foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important component of economic
growth and prosperity ... and that a crucial, if not decisive, factor in enticing investment is a
stable, consistent, fair and transparent legal and judicial system."), available at
http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp26.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2003). Hewko is skeptical of the
conventional wisdom, arguing that "the philosophical framework the international develop-
ment community has traditionally used to carry out its legislative and institutional reform
efforts ... is incomplete .. " Id. at 4.
4. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 517, 521 (2001).
The rule of law revival that we are experiencing today is not just a product of the neoliberal
development paradigm but also of the recent triumphs of the human rights movement. The
growing attachment to human rights has been warmly applauded throughout the world ....
It represents, as Michael Ignatieff has said, a revolution in human consciousness. As part of
this revolution, there has been an increasing demand for law, or, more specifically, for the
treatment of human rights as justiciable claims rather than mere aspirations, and for legal in-
stitutions that are able to enforce these claims.
In the wake of September 11, the human-rights community has redoubled its commit-
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security experts also want to promote the rule of law, viewing it as a
key aspect of preventing terrorism.5
Given their conflicting priorities, human-rights advocates, eco-
nomic analysts, and those concerned primarily with national and
international security naturally differ on the proper law-reform priori-
ties for transitional societies. They battle over whether commercial-
law reform should precede criminal-law reform, whether the creation
of new commercial courts should take priority over the creation of
human rights and war crimes courts, and whether judicial reform
ought to come before police reform. Since September 11, 2001, the
three groups have also disagreed about the imperatives of the "war on
terror," which many rights advocates see as privileging short-term
security concerns over longer-term commitments to promoting human
rights.6 Nonetheless, the three groups (which can overlap) share the
basic assumption that the rule of law is central to stable and modern
democratic society.7
ment to promoting "the rule of law," although many within the human-rights community
have grown increasingly concerned by the apparent willingness of some democratic govern-
ments to value national-security concerns over strict adherence to domestic and interna-
tional legal norms. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF
POWERS: How CHANGES TO U.S. LAW AND SECURITY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2003).
5. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IRAQ: THE DAY AFTER (2003); see also
Robert G. Kaiser, U.S. Plants Footprint in Shaky Central Asia, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2002,
at Al; Thomas Carothers, The New Aid, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2002, at A19; Thomas
Carothers, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 84.
The United States faces two contradictory imperatives: on the one hand, the fight against al
Qaeda tempts Washington to put aside its democratic scruples and seek closer ties with
autocracies throughout the Middle East and Asia. On the other hand, U.S. officials and pol-
icy experts have increasingly come to believe that it is precisely the lack of democracy in
many of these countries that helps breed Islamic extremism.
Id. Post-September 11 events have undeniably raised new questions about whether even
democratic cultures share a universal conception of the rule of law and its relative impor-
tance vis-A-vis national security. Nevertheless, rhetorical commitments to the rule of law also
continue to be made by numerous governmental actors. See, e.g., George W. Bush, State of
the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002) ("America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable
demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for
women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.") (transcript
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html). Similarly,
the U.S. Department of State puts news releases related to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners
of war and Guantanamo detainees in a section of its website titled "The Rule of Law: War
on Terrorism." U.S. Dep't of State, The Rule of Law: War on Terrorism, at http://usinfo.
state.gov/topical/rights/law/warlaw.htm (last visited July 25, 2003). As this Article will dis-
cuss, the concept of the rule of law is amorphous and undertheorized; perhaps for this
reason, groups as otherwise disparate as free-market advocates, human-rights activists, and
national-security hawks have all been eager to embrace the concept.
6. See, e.g., Anti-Terror Campaign Cloaking Human Rights Abuse, HUM. RTS. NEWS ,
Jan. 16, 2002 (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2002/01/wr2002.htm.
7. What's more, despite tussles over priorities, all three groups often assume that creat-
ing the rule of law in one sphere will have automatic positive spillover effects in the other:
that is, if a given society has functioning judicial bodies that enforce contracts fairly and
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The U.S. and other international actors8 have supported programs
designed to promote the rule of law for years, with many early efforts
in Latin America.' The pace and funding levels of those programs
increased dramatically in the early 1990s, as the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the toppling of totalitarian regimes in other parts of the
globe dramatically energized rule-of-law assistance." According to
Freedom House, a leading nongovernmental organization, fledgling
democracies were springing up worldwide during the 90s," and
international organizations and donors rushed to help; in the wake of
the Soviet Union's collapse, one commentator describes a veritable
"explosion of rule-of-law assistance" around the world. 2
An increasing number of "failed states," civil wars, and human-
rights crises have also helped fuel enthusiasm for rule-of-law promo-
tion efforts, with ambitious rule-of-law programs in areas as disparate
as Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Since
1990, the U.S. and other bilateral and multilateral donors have spent
literally billions of dollars on promoting the rule of law, and those
huge governmental sums have been matched by similarly large
protect property rights, that society will ultimately also protect basic civil and political rights,
and vice versa. See Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 2. There is, to my knowl-
edge, little empirical evidence to support this assumption, and some work that calls it into
question. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Political Corruption and Democracy, 14 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 363 (1999); see also HEWKO, supra note 3.
8. The diverse group of supporters of rule-of-law programs includes various countries,
particularly the European states and Japan, and also regional and intergovernmental organi-
zations such as the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the World Bank, and the IMF.
9. For a description and analysis of many of these early programs, see Linn
Hammergren, Applying Rule of Law Lessons from Latin America, DEMOCRACY DIALOGUE
(USAID Center for Democracy and Governance), Fall 1997, available at http://www.usaid.
gov/democracy/pdfs/ddfallwin97_fi.pdf.
10. See Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 2.
11. According to Freedom House, 120 of the world's 192 states are now electoral de-
mocracies - compared to 22 states in 1950. FREEDOM HOUSE, DEMOCRACY'S CENTURY: A
SURVEY OF GLOBAL POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE 20TH CENTURY (Dec. 7, t999), available at
http://freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html; see also Madeleine Albright, Remarks to the
National Democratic Institute International Leaders Forum (Aug. 13, 2000) ("I am confi-
dent that when the history of the 1990's is written, the growth of democracy will be its domi-
nant theme.") (transcript available at http://www.usembassy.it/file2000_08/alia/a0081404.
htm).
12. THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
165 (1999). For some similar observations, see Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest:
Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 325 (1998), noting
[tihe upsurge of interest in comparative constitutional law among U.S. constitutional schol-
ars [which] may be the result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the rapid and
widespread transformation of non-democratic regimes in proto-democratic or democratic
nation-states. A byproduct of the rapidity with which the change occurred was the prolifera-
tion of efforts by U.S. constitutionalists to instruct people elsewhere on what a well-designed
constitution should look like.
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donations from private foundations. 3 The war on terrorism has given
further impetus to U.S. and international enthusiasm for rule-of-law
promotion; most recently, millions have been pledged for rule-of-law
programs in post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-war Iraq.14Until less than a decade ago, rule-of-law assistance traditionally
involved aid packages designed to encourage governmental law-
reform initiatives and support law-related nongovernmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs"). 5 In recent years, however, with the upsurge in
United Nations and NATO peacekeeping operations, there have been
more and more situations in which the U.S., UN, and other key actors
(The European Union ("EU"), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"), etc.) find themselves wholly or
partially administering a society in crisis.
In Kosovo, the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and NATO still collabo-
rate to administer Kosovo under a UN umbrella, assisting the fledgling
Kosovar governance structure; in East Timor, the UN was the central
government until the recent elections and still administers numerous
"government" programs; in Sierra Leone, the fragile indigenous
government relies heavily on UN administrators and peacekeeping
troops to preserve the still-tenuous peace and help with everything
from education, health care, and food aid to legal and judicial reform.
The Bush administration's early determination to resist Clinton-
style "nation building" adventures collapsed in the wake of September
11. Today, Afghanistan is essentially run (though not particularly well
run) by the UN, the EU, and dozens of international NGOs, with
extensive assistance from U.S. troops and civilian personnel. Inter-
national experts inspect Afghan prisons, train police and judges, plan
elections, and help rewrite the laws. An international security-
assistance force patrols the streets of Kabul, and American soldiers
continue military operations to root out al Qaeda forces in the rest of
the country.16 In Iraq, the American presence is felt everywhere.
13. See Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 2. While some of that money has
gone to indigenous nongovernmental organizations in the target countries, or to government
coffers, a great deal of it has gone toward paying the salaries of peripatetic international
lawyers, many of them Americans, who trot around the globe, rack up frequent-flyer miles,
and give advice (often unsolicited) to citizens and government officials in far-off lands.
14. See, e.g., USAID, REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.dec.org/pdf docs/PNACQ617.pdf.
15. See Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 2.
16. See generally CONSORTIUM FOR RESPONSE TO THE AFG. TRANSITION, FILLING THE
VACUUM: PREREQUISITES TO SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.hrlawgroup.org/resources/content/AfghanRpt.pdf. Many critics charge that the
international community has nevertheless put too few resources into rebuilding Afghanistan,
and that lawlessness prevails in much of the country. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
Afghanistan, in WORLD REPORT 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/asial.html; see
also Afghanistan Weekly Situation Reports (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), July 28
- Aug. 3, 2002, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/c7ca0eaf6c79faae852567af00
3c69ca/556e95a56f2e470ac1256c0f004cfa70?OpenDocument [hereinafter Afghanistan Week-
June 20031 2279
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Nearly 150,000 U.S. soldiers remain in Iraq today,17 and Iraq is gov-
erned by an American civilian administrator who reports directly to
the U.S. Department of Defense.18 American military police are in
charge at Baghdad police stations; American JAG lawyers supervise
Iraqi courts; Iraqis accused of crimes are detained by U.S. soldiers at,
U.S. military bases. 9
In an increasing number of places, promoting the rule of law has
become a fundamentally imperialist enterprise, in which foreign
administrators backed by large armies govern societies that have been
pronounced unready to take on the task of governing themselves."
B. A String of Expensive Disappointments
Despite billions of aid dollars, programs to promote the rule of law
have been disappointing.2" For example, in Russia, more than a decade
after a massive infusion of foreign aid began, there have been few rule
of law success stories. Organized crime continues to play an enormous
role in the economy, corruption among public official shows no sign of
abating, economic hardship continues for millions, life expectancy
remains lower than it was under communism, the prisons are over-
crowded and allegations of abuse routine, and Russia's ill-starred and
never-ending military campaign in Chechnya has killed thousands,
including many civilians who died as a result of massive Russian
bombardments in Grozny.22
ly Situation Reports f]; Afghanistan Weekly Situation Reports (UN Assistance Mission in Af-
ghanistan), Aug. 4-11, 2002, available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/c7caO
eaf6c79faae852567af003c69ca/603233c16clda59349256cla000dfb44?OpenDocument [here-
inafter Afghanistan Weekly Situation Reports I]; Telephone Interview with William H.
Spencer, Senior Advisor, International Resource Group (Aug. 26, 2002) (notes on file with
author). News reports confirm these sources. See, e.g., Belquis Ahmadi, Reality Gap in Af-
ghanistan, WASH. POST, July 8, 2002, at A17; Alex Spillius, Afghans to Carry on Stoning
Criminals, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 5, 2001, at 16.
17. See John Milburn, Roberts Sees Need for Larger Armed Forces, Defends Iraq Mis-
sion, ASSOCIATED PRESS WIRE, Aug. 29, 2003, available at WL 8/29/03 APWIRES 19:35:00.
18. See Kathleen T. Rhem, Bush Appoints State Department Official to Administer Iraq,
American Forces Information Service, May 6, 2003, available at www.dod.mil/news/
May2003/n05062003_200305061.html.
19. See generally News Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Defense, DoD News Briefing -
Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer (July 24, 2003), available at
www.dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr2003O724-secdefO452.html. These comments are also based
on the author's personal observations during a trip to Iraq in August 2003.
20. For a critical commentary on America's role in these increasingly imperialist
enterprises, see, for example, Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire: The Burden, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
21. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes, Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law?, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Fall 1999, at 68; see also Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 2.
22. See CAROTHERS, supra note 12, at 171-72 ("In other parts of the world where the
U.S. has invested significantly in rule-of-law aid, disappointment is also common.... [Slome
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In Kosovo, four years after a massive NATO bombing campaign,
things are little better, despite the fact that the international commu-
nity literally took over the province's administration. For three years
after the air campaign ended, Kosovo was run by over 40,000 NATO
troops and a civilian UN administration that amounted to almost ten
thousand additional foreigners (including NGO representatives,
civilian police, and OSCE, and EU staff).23 This worked out to roughly
one foreigner for every thirty-six Kosovars, a ratio of foreign occupiers
to locals that would have inspired the envy of nineteenth-century
colonial powers. Today, more than 20,000 NATO troops still remain,24
but ethnic intolerance continues to rage, with daily assaults and
frequent murders; thuggishness and organized crime grow virtually
unchecked.2' The fledgling UN-sponsored judicial system remains
unable to offer even reasonably speedy trials, much less consistent and
independent rulings.2 6
The same story could be told in dozens of other places, all at
varying stages in the "transition to democracy" (an optimistic phrase).
In Latin America, many commentators have concluded that the earlier
era of rule-of-law promotion programs have had little lasting impact. 27
More recent experiments have similarly been of questionable value.
In Sierra Leone, 17,000 UN peacekeeping troops from thirty-one
countries 28 remain unable to ensure basic security in parts of Sierra
Leone's territory,29 much less guarantee accountability for past
ten years later, the lack of rule of law in Russia is an open sore. ); ANATOL LIEVEN,
CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER (1998); see also Holmes, supra note 21.
23. See NATO, KFOR INFORMATION, at http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm (pub-
lished Dec. 30, 2002).
24. E-mail from KFOR press spokesman Chris Thompson to author (Oct. 10, 2003) (on
file with author).
25. See, e.g., LEGAL SYS. MONITORING SEC., ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR.
MISSION IN KOSovo, REPORT 9: ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (Mar. 2002), avail-
able at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/report9_eng.pdf; see also
DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW, ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR.
MISSION IN KOSOVO, REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SEPTEMBER 2001-
FEBRUARY 2002 (2002), available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/ustice/
criminaljustice4_eng.pdf. (last visited Aug. 25, 2002).
26. See, e.g., LEGAL SYS. MONITORING SEC., supra note 25; DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND RULE OF LAW, supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., LINN HAMMERGREN, DO JUDICIAL COUNCILS FURTHER JUDICIAL
REFORM? LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working
Paper, Rule of Law Series No. 28, June 2002); see also Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival,
supra note 2; Hammergren, supra note 9.
28. See UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE, FACT SHEET, at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/unamsil.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
29. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR
INFORMATION SHEET FOR SIERRA LEONE (Feb. 13, 2003).
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abuses. 0 In East Timor, 5,000 blue-helmeted UN troops and the civil-
ian UN administration struggle to maintain their credibility in the face
of economic depression and continued security threats from pro-
Indonesian militias.3"
The news from Afghanistan is similarly disheartening: the delivery
of aid funds has been delayed; security problems have prevented judi-
cial and legal assessments beyond the capital city of Kabul; in much of
the country women reportedly face serious retaliation if they fail to
wear the burqa; prison conditions are reportedly appalling; a resur-
gence of Taliban military activity has killed hundreds of Afghans;
many Taliban-era regulations are still enforced, although technically
no longer valid; and the new chief justice has spoken publicly in favor
of punishments such as the execution of adulterers by stoning or
flogging.32
Meanwhile, in Iraq, five months after President George W. Bush
announced the end of "major combat," American soldiers continue to
be killed and wounded by hostile forces on an almost daily basis.33
Sabotage has slowed the restoration of basic services such as electric-
ity.34 Deadly terrorist attacks on the United Nations and on nongov-
ernmental organizations have slowed reconstruction efforts. The
newly reconstituted Iraqi police remain unable to prevent widespread
violent crime,36 and the police themselves have increasingly been the
targets of deadly terrorist violence.37
30. See, e.g., Sierra Leone Indictments Welcomed, HUM. RTs. NEWS (Human Rights
Watch, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 11, 2003 (noting that despite recent indictments issued by the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, "[blecause the Special Court is anticipated to prosecute
around twenty persons, it will leave many crimes unaddressed"), at http://www.hrw.
org/press/2003/03/sleoneO3llO3.htm.
31. See MISSION IN SUPPORT OF E. TIMOR, UNITED NATIONS, FACTS AND FIGURES, at
http://www.un.org/peace/timor/unmisetF.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
32. See, e.g., CONSORTIUM FOR RESPONSE TO THE AFG. TRANSITION, supra note 16; see
also Afghanistan Weekly Situation Reports I, supra note 16; Afghanistan Weekly Situation
Reports 11, supra note 16; Telephone Interview with William H. Spencer, supra note 16.
News reports confirm these sources. See, e.g., Ahmadi, supra note 16; Spillius, supra note 16;
Ben Ehrenreich, Afghanistan Revisited, L.A. WEEKLY, Oct. 3-9, 2003, available at http://
www.laweekly.com/ink/03/46/features-ehrenreich.php.
33. See Alex Berenson, Two US Soldiers Are Killed in Iraq; One of Them Is a Woman,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at A14.
34. See Harry de Quetteville, Dane Killed as Sabotage Stretches Coalition in Iraq, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 61864303.
35. See Alex Berenson, U.N. Chief Orders Further Reduction of Staff in Baghdad, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A8.
36. See Alex Berenson, Iraqis' New Army Gets Slow Start, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, at
At.
37. See Bombers Kill 8, SUN (London), Oct. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Sun File.
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In a sense, citizens of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the like must
put up with some of the worst aspects of imperialism (culturally insen-
sitive occupying armies that drive up prices, distort local economies,
and push through ham-handed "reforms") with few of imperialism's
benefits, such as they were; the new imperialists lack the capacity or
the will to stamp out crime, pick up the trash, or make the trains run
on time.
C. What's Gone Wrong?
The very concept of the rule of law is rarely examined or
understood by key U.S. and international decisionmakers," although
"promoting the rule of law" has become a mantra for many in the
foreign-policy, human-rights, and international-development commu-
nities.39 There is a substantial academic literature on the nuances of
the idea of the rule of law,4" but for the most part, decisionmakers and
commentators - including many scholars in the international-law and
human-rights-law communities - do not engage with this literature.
Decisionmakers and commentators tend to conflate formal and pro-
cedural aspects of the rule of law (such as structurally independent
courts, "modernized" legislation, etc.) with a more substantive concep-
tion (such as respect for individual and minority rights, a commitment
to nonviolent means of resolving disputes, substantive due process,
and so on).42 Most decisionmakers recognize in theory that the rule of
38. See, e.g., CAROTHERS, supra note 12, at 165:
Aid providers interested in promoting the rule of law have not, for the most part, agonized
much about the complexity and even ineffability of the concept. They have concentrated on
two of its most tangible manifestations - the state institutions that play a central role in the
enforcement of law and the written laws themselves.
39. See John V. Orth, Exporting the Rule of Law, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 71,
71 (1998) ("The Rule of Law is routinely prescribed these days for what ails the post-
Communist World."); see also Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 2; Holmes,
supra note 21; WORLD BANK, RULE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, at http://wwwl.
worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/ruleoflawandevelopment.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
40. See, e.g., Orth, supra note 39; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a
Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); David Kairys, Searching
for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV 307 (2003); Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity's Law:
Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355 (2002).
41. In part, this may be because much of the scholarly discussion of the idea of the rule
of law takes relatively stable, peaceful, and law-oriented societies as the starting point for
analysis, not the end point. Disputes have to do primarily with how to perfect the rule of law,
or with disagreements about its definition and methods for evaluating it. This makes such
discussions less than wholly useful for scholars and practitioners who wish to understand
how the rule of law might be created where it does not exist at all.
42. Both common sense and the academic literature warn against the easy assumption
that formalistic transplants such as constitutions and legal institutions will automatically
produce the desired changes in culture and behavior. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, The
Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 403 (1996) (warning that
"[p]lanting a [constitutional] proposition in a different cultural, historical, or traditional
context may lead to results quite different from those one finds in the country from which
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law has important normative, substantive, and formal dimensions. Yet,
in practice, rule-of-law promotion efforts continue to focus on estab-
lishing the formal dimensions of the rule of law, assuming with little
evidence that this will lead reliably and predictably to the emergence
of a robust societal commitment to the more substantive aspects of the
rule of law.43
For the most part, the U.S. human-rights and foreign-policy com-'
munities have applied an identical template to societies all over the
world, taking little account of their differences or the template's
failures in other places." (And it is not only the U.S. foreign-policy
community that does this: the UN, the World Bank, the EU, the
OSCE, large philanthropic foundations such as Ford, MacArthur,
Rockefeller, and other major players have all taken essentially the
same approach.)45 In his recent book Aiding Democracy Abroad, Tom
Carothers of the U.S. Institute for Peace even offers (by no means
uncritically) what he refers to as the "Rule of Law Assistance
Standard Menu." It includes "reforming institutions" (judicial reform,
strengthening legislatures, police and prison reform, etc.), "[r]ewriting
laws" (modernizing criminal, civil, and commercial laws), "[u]pgrading
the legal profession through support for stronger bar associations and
the proposition was borrowed"). This is all the more true when the thing to be transplanted
is as capacious as the very idea of the rule of law. Nonetheless, in practice, the same formal-
istic mistakes are made time and again.
43. Legal scholars have offered varying definitions of the rule of law. See, e.g., William
C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 Wis. L. REV 723; see also Fallon, supra note 40, at 7-9
(distinguishing between formalist, historicist, substantive, and legal process "ideal types" of
the rule-of-law concept). Most of the varying conceptions contain at least some overlapping
components, however, as do the varying conceptions of the rule of law drawn upon by the
foreign-policy community. Most assume that the rule of law has both a formal component
(statutes, rules known in advance, courts, politically independent judiciary with powers of
judicial review, etc.) and a substantive component that implicitly is nonpositivist. To most in
the foreign-policy community, the rule of law also involves laws that comport with basic
notions of human rights. Fallon notes that most conceptions of the rule of law share three
purposes or values: protection against anarchy and the Hobbesian war of all against all; cre-
ating conditions in which people can plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that they
can know in advance the legal consequences of their actions; and protection against some
types of official arbitrariness. Id. Beyond these purposes of the rule of law, Fallon notes that
most conceptions of the rule of law emphasize five basic elements: 1) people must be able to
understand and comply with the law - thus, the rule of law must involve the existence of
some set of legal rules, standards, and principles that can guide people; 2) the law should ac-,
tually guide people; 3) the law should be reasonably stable; 4) the law should be supreme,
ruling officials and judges as well as ordinary citizens; and 5) there should exist "instrumen-
talities of impartial justice" - that is, the rule of law requires courts that employ fair proce-
dures. Id. at 8-9.
44. See CAROTHERS, supra note 12, at 176 (noting, "As aid providers attempt judicial
reform work in previously uncharted regions, they seem determined to repeat mistakes
made in other places.").
45. See generally CAROTHERS, supra note 12.
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law schools," and "[i]ncreasing legal access and advocacy" through the
support of legal-advocacy NGOs, law-school clinics, and so on.46
This model simply does not work.47 What this type of formalistic
approach fails fully to recognize or acknowledge is that creating the
rule of law is most fundamentally an issue of norm creation.48 The rule
of law is not something that exists "beyond culture" and that can
be somehow added to an existing culture by the simple expedient of
creating formal structures and rewriting constitutions and statutes. In
its substantive sense, the rule of law is a culture, yet the human-rights-
law and foreign-policy communities know very little - and manifest
little curiosity - about the complex processes by which cultures are
created and changed.49
Recent U.S. and international interventions to promote the rule of
law (interventions through military force and through massive aid
infusions designed to alter fundamental aspects of societies) have been
disappointing in large part because their architects are unwilling to
grapple with complex issues of norm creation and the relationship
between "law" and "norms." We have failed to define or justify our
goals and we have failed to even ask, much less search for the answers,
to some very basic questions about how and when societies change,
46. Id. at 165, 168. Although Carothers notes that rule-of-law promotion efforts have
been less than fully successful, and that law is "about norms and values" as much as it is
about institutions and statutes, his concrete suggestions for improving rule-of-law promotion
seem limited to adding a focus on "bottom-up efforts that work with civil society as well as
with governmental entities." Id. at 115. His approach is similar to that taken by Stephen
Holmes. See Holmes, supra note 21.
47. See CAROTHERS, supra note 12, at 170 ("What stands out about U.S. rule-of-law
assistance since the mid-1980s is how difficult and often disappointing such work is.").
48. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in
United Nations Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
811, 860 (1997) (noting that democracy building "is a goal to be assisted through norm crea-
tion, education, electoral observation, and other modes of peaceful engagement. [It is not] a
charter for an intolerant one-size-fits-all dogma. Room must always be left for the many
paths to the same bottom line which honor local conditions and wishes."). Outside of the
academy, however, these insights are given a certain amount of lip service, but they rarely
bring decisionmakers to reexamine the thrust of rule-of-law promotion efforts.
49. Cf. KAHN, supra note 2, at 2. Kahn argues for "the cultural study of law":
If we approach law's rule as the imaginative construction of a complete worldview, we need
to bring to its study those techniques that take as their object the experience of meaning.
Inquiry must begin with a thick description of the legal event as it appears to a subject
already prepared to recognize the authority of law. That subject brings to the event a unique
understanding of time, space, community, and authority. He or she also brings an
understanding of the self as a legal subject. These are the constitutive elements of that form
of political experience we describe as the rule of law. A cultural study of law advances from
thick descriptions to the interpretive elaboration of each of these imaginative structures, all
of which together make possible the experience of law's rule. All questions of reform - the
traditional end of legal study - are bracketed. They are not abandoned forever, but they are
left aside as long as this form of inquiry continues. The object here is not to make us -
personally or communally - better, but to understand who we really are.
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what role (if any) law can play in such cultural change, whether law
has any necessary correlation with order and violence, and how and
when outsiders (or insiders, for that matter) can promote norm change
in particular directions. 0
These questions are urgent and of far more than just academic
interest. Globalization, the decline of state structures, intrastate group
conflicts, and the rise of organized terrorist groups that recruit heavily
in poor and "lawless" regions make it overwhelmingly likely that the
U.S. and the international community will continue to become
involved in what we once might have dismissed as the "internal
affairs" of foreign states. (And although the theoretical insights about
the relationship between law and violence are of urgent importance in
the international domain, they are equally applicable to domestic set-
tings.) The U.S. and the international community will continue to
promote the rule of law through foreign-aid programs, through diplo-
macy, and at times through military interventions and peacekeeping
forces. We will also continue to promote the rule of law through
lawyers: through America's law schools and various American Bar
Association projects, lawyers and legal scholars will continue to work
as employees and consultants for the U.S. Agency for International
Development, for foreign governments, for the UN, and for NGOs5 1
More and more law students will become involved in this work both
while in school and after graduation, and these students will hunger
for courses and scholarship on these issues. If we are to respond to this
trend in a meaningful way, issues of norm creation will have to move
to center stage in international and comparative law, and in the grow-
50. Readers may ask what it is I mean by such terms as "society," "culture," "norms,"
"law," and the "rule of law," all terms which have been defined in numerous different ways
by numerous different scholars. I use the terms in a general, common-sense way. Thus, I use
"society" to refer to a group of people living in a reasonably bounded geographical area and
tied together by at least some common governmental institutions, history, a language, cer-
tain customs, etc. I use "culture" to mean the widely shared myths, assumptions, behavioral
patterns, customs, rituals, and social and historical understandings of a group. I use "norms"
to mean widely shared attitudes and their associated behavioral imperatives. I use the term
"law" primarily in a somewhat more restrictive sense in this Article, since I am interested in
the formal law of statutes and institutions, regardless of whether such law is widely accepted,
enforceable, or in fact enforced. At other times, I discuss law as one of the many kinds of
social narratives different cultures use to make sense of violence, but when I use law in this
different sense I make it clear in the text. I take "the rule of law" to mean several things,
both the existence of certain kinds of functioning institutions and an enforceable body of
rules, and at the same time a widely shared societal/cultural commitment to the idea that
formal law is the best way to resolve certain kinds of disputes, that the state should have
monopoly on violence, and that the law should be built on substantive principles such as due
process, equal protection, and so forth. Throughout this Article, I note that these two aspects
of the rule of law are often conflated, or the existence of the second aspect is presumed to
follow naturally from the first, or both. For a broader discussion of how the concept of the
rule of law is used in American constitutional discourse, see, for example, Fallon, supra note
40.
51. See Tushnet, supra note 12.
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ing scholarly literature on promoting the rule of law in the interna-
tional arena and individual societies around the globe.
There is an irony here that is worth noting. For years, legal
scholars who focused on domestic legal issues dismissed international
law as "not really law," but something else: unenforceable moral
directive, for instance, or mere politics.5 2 In other words, the claim was
that international law is really a matter of social norms, not law.
Today, however, domestic-law experts are beginning to recognize the
powerful role social norms often play in guiding, buttressing, and
sometimes undermining domestic law.53
Ironically, at the very same time, many international-law experts
are hailing a new age of international law, one in which international
law is increasingly interpreted by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies
whose decisions are increasingly backed by substantial coercive
powers (in the form of a widespread willingness on the part of more
and more states to use economic sanctions and, at times, military force
to enforce those decisions). 4 In other words, just as many domestic-
law experts are belatedly recognizing the critical importance of social
norms to law, and the need to understand how norms and law interact,
some international legal scholars are insisting triumphantly that inter-
national law has moved beyond "mere" norms."
52. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 164-67
(Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) (arguing that international law
is merely "morality," not law, since it is not enforced through sovereign coercion); H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that international law is not true
law because it lacks "secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legisla-
tures and courts" and lacks a "unifying rule of recognition"). See generally Anthony
D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1.293 (1984); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (dis-
cussing this debate); Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 114 (1991) (noting, "Under the assumptions of liberalism, international
law must collapse into political choice."). Purvis also notes that to Critical Legal Studies, the
claim of international law to objectivity and naturalness "hides the deep incoherence, nor-
mative basis, and indeterminacy of international law." Id.
53. For an introduction to this literature, see Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics
Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998). See also Steven Hetcher, Creating
Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999).
54. Consider the emergence of the ad hoc international-criminal tribunals, the evolution
of the International Criminal Court, tribunals for resolving WTO disputes, and so on. For a
somewhat skeptical account of these developments, see generally Paul B. Stephan,
International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 237 (2000). See also
Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law - Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555 (1999).
55. Some might question whether this is still true in the wake of the U.S.'s more or less
unilateral decision to invade Iraq. I think it is; notably, the U.S. cast its military intervention
in Iraq in terms of enforcing preexisting security council resolutions. While the sincerity of
this motive can be questioned - as can the validity of the underlying interpretation of the
applicable legal framework - it is worth noting that even the most unilaterally oriented in
the Bush administration felt that this was necessary to legitimize U.S. action.
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A key challenge for international- and comparative-law scholars
today is to reinvigorate the study of norms as part of the study of
international law, international human-rights law, comparative law,
and international affairs.56
In particular, we need to study norm change in the places and
moments where international law, domestic law, and comparative law
intersect. Traditionally, international, comparative, and domestic law
were seen by most scholars as largely separate areas for analysis:
international-law scholars studied the rules governing interactions
between states; comparativists examined different domestic legal sys-
tems in an effort to understand their provenance and seek out creative
ways to borrow useful ideas from other legal cultures; domestic-law
scholars studied the laws of their own country; and all viewed the
occasional areas of overlap as more or less incidental. Thus, some
studied the development of transnational legal process; some studied
how different national legal regimes "borrowed" from one another;
and some studied law and legal process within relatively bounded
societies. Meanwhile, an important area of study slipped through the
cracks - the study of how societies do or do not absorb the norms
associated with international law, in a context where actors from
different states interact in complex transitional and crisis situations.
The urgency of this project is only increased by the same trends
that have led some scholars to assert that international law is begin-
ning to look more like "real" law: the decline of the idea of absolute
state sovereignty, the increasing importance of international human-
rights law, the growth in transnational and regional tribunals and arbi-
tration regimes, and the steady movement in many parts of the world
towards the incorporation of international law into domestic law.
These trends are partly a product of the emergence of new kinds of
transnational actors, from NGOs, to multinational corporations, to
globally diffuse terrorist networks. These developments blur the lines
between international law, comparative law, and domestic law. Today,
domestic, regional, and international regimes are increasingly
interwoven and overlapping, albeit in ways that are ad hoc and
constantly evolving. We are quite possibly in the midst of one of the
greatest periods of global cultural diffusion and adaptation the world
56. Some scholars have addressed these issues. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 52, at 70 (urg-,
ing scholars to attempt a "thick description" of transnational legal process); see also Purvis,
supra note 52 (suggesting that structuralist anthropology may have much to offer,
international-law scholars and urging that international law be understood in terms of myth,
ritual, etc.). Nonetheless, most such work has focused on state compliance with international
law, not on the degree to which international-law norms about human rights, the rule of law,
humanitarian law, etc., are truly internalized by the citizens of states, as well as reflected in
treaties, statutes, and government practice. With the growing importance of nonstate actors
(from armed insurgent forces, to ethnic groups, to multinational corporations) this
near-exclusive focus on government elites becomes increasingly problematic.
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has ever known,57 and we can no longer afford to ignore these emerg-
ing legal-process issues.
The goal of this Article is to participate in the challenging project
of carving out a new area of study in the place where international
law, comparative law, and domestic law intersect. In this Article, I use
the story of flawed rule-of-law assistance efforts to demonstrate the
importance of this inquiry.
I take as a basic premise that there are many situations in which it
is justifiable and beneficial for the U.S. and other actors to seek to
promote human rights and the rule of law abroad, and that at times
even military interventions are a necessary and justifiable part of this
effort. These are controversial statements (and do not imply endorse-
ment of any particular past intervention), but I will simply assume
their truth for the limited purposes of this Article.
If we assume that efforts to promote the rule of law are important
and justifiable, however, we need to make those efforts as effective as
possible. The initial goal of this Article, then, is to convince readers
that there is indeed a problem with how we go about promoting
human rights and the rule of law.58 I argue that the root cause of the
problem is the failure to take seriously issues of norm creation, and
the complex relation between law and norms. In part, truly acknowl-
edging this problem must involve recognizing something lawyers are
often reluctant to acknowledge - that at times "the law" in its formal
sense is of peripheral importance at best. Although we imagine that
the trappings of formal law are central to creating order and reducing
violence, there is little evidence that this is so. 9
Second, this Article seeks to map out a preliminary research
agenda for this new field, outlining the kinds of questions we urgently
need to start asking, and suggesting some of the things we will need to
do to start feeling our way towards some answers. I recognize, of
course, that we may never have complete answers to questions of such
complexity, but insist nonetheless that we can be at least a little bit
more sophisticated than we currently are. Finally, I want to suggest
some very preliminary hypotheses about what those answers might
look like.
57. For two very different perspectives on this, see, for example, BENJAMIN R. BARBER,
JIHAD V. MCWORLD (1995), and SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
58. This is in part because there is a real disconnect between the academic literature on
the rule of law and rule-of-law promotion on the ground. Part II, infra, provides a case study
of Kosovo and how efforts on the ground to promote the rule of law can go awry.
59. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosen, A Consumer's Guide to Law and the Social Sciences, 100
YALE L.J. 531, 543 (1990) (reviewing LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Leon Lipson &
Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (noting, "Law may matter, but until the resonances among nu-
merous domains have been sought out, the centrality of any given institution cannot be pre-
sumed.")).
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II. CASE STUDY: Kosovo
The previous section noted that many recent rule-of-law promo-
tion efforts have been surprisingly unnuanced and formalistic, and
their shallow formalism has condemned them to irrelevance at best.
At worst, such approaches may not only fail to create the rule of law
- they may actually undermine the rule of law. Several examples, all
from events of the last few years in Kosovo, help illustrate these
points. The Kosovo experience makes a useful case study because it is
neither too far in the past to provide valid insight into current
approaches and problems, nor too recent for us to draw meaningful
conclusions about its successes and failures.6"
Much of the discussion that follows is drawn from personal experi-
ences working in Kosovo in 1999 and 2000, as well as from follow-up
discussions with numerous colleagues and former colleagues still
working in Kosovo. First, some background.6' When Milosevic agreed
to withdraw Serbian troops from Kosovo after months of NATO
bombs, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244,62 which
created an international civilian administration in Kosovo under the
auspices of the UN. This civilian administration became known as
UNMIK, short for UN Mission in Kosovo. Bernard Kouchner,
the French human-rights advocate who founded Mddecins Sans
Fronti~res, was appointed as UNMIK's head, the Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary General ("SRSG"). His deputy was Jock Covey,
a former U.S. State Department official.63
When Kouchner and a small army of international experts arrived
in the battered city of Pristina in June 1999, they faced the daunting
challenge of governing 1.8 million people in a devastated region with
no functioning courts, no functioning prisons, and no police. A decade
earlier, when the Serbs ended Kosovo's political autonomy within
Yugoslavia in 1989, Albanians were dismissed from most public-sector
jobs and denied access to higher education. As a result, immediately
before the NATO air war began, all of the judges in Kosovo were
Serbs, as were most of the practicing lawyers (discriminatory laws
60. Events in Afghanistan are unfolding too rapidly for Afghanistan to make a useful
case study, but as noted previously, early indications suggest that rule-of-law promotion
efforts there are encountering the same problems as past efforts in Kosovo and elsewhere.
61. For good general histories of Kosovo, see TIM JUDAH, KosOvO: WAR AND
REVENGE (2000), and NOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY (2000). The discus-
sion that follows draws mainly on my field research in Kosovo for the U.S. Department of
State in 1999 and 2000, and on numerous informal conversations with colleagues and former
colleagues since then.
62. S. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
63. See generally KOSOVO JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT (prepared by
interagency group led by members of Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, U.S.
Dep't of State) (April 2000), available at http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/jud.pdf.
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meant that Albanian lawyers had only very limited practice opportuni-
ties). All of the police were Serbs. Albanians were fired from the law
faculty at the University of Pristina and Albanian law students were
forced to study in private houses to earn a law diploma that the Serbs
refused to recognize anyway. When NATO ended its bombing
campaign and hundreds of thousands of angry Kosovar Albanians
rushed back home from the refugee camps of Macedonia and Albania,
many Serbs fled, fearing - rightly, as it turned out - that they would
be subject to violent acts of revenge. The short-term result was that
after the war, since most of the Serbs had fled and the Albanians were
ten years out of practice, Kosovo was left without a functioning civil
service.'
A. Looking for the Law
When UNMIK set up shop in the summer of 1999, Kosovo lacked
courts, police, prisons, lawyers, and judges. It also lacked an agreed-
upon body of law. After all, if Serbia was no longer in charge, and the
UN was running the show, what body of law was applicable in
Kosovo? What laws should govern the apprehension and trial
of criminal suspects, the thorny problem of disputed property claims,
and the actions of UNMIK itself? The route UNMIK took to resolve
these issues demonstrates that simplistic formalism is a dead end for
reformers when more culturally potent symbolic issues are at stake.
After a brief consideration of the problem of applicable law,
UNMIK head Bernard Kouchner decided that the simplest thing to do
was make the applicable law in UN-administered Kosovo the same as
the law that was applicable before the NATO air campaign began. He
issued UNMIK Regulation 1, which stated that "the laws applicable in
the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall continue to apply
in Kosovo," insofar as those pre-March 1999 laws did not conflict with
internationally recognized human-rights standards, the UNMIK
mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, or any other
UNMIK regulation.65
A fine idea, one which William of Occam would have approved -
until he saw the resulting chaos. The problem was that to Kosovo's
one and one-half million ethnic Albanians, the applicable laws in
Kosovo before the bombing campaign began were "Serb laws," a key
symbol of Serbian oppression against the Albanians. While the
concept of "honor" may have little salience in modern America, in
64. See generally KoSOvo JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT, supra note 63.
65. UNMIK REGULATION No. 1999/1 § 3, reprinted in KOSovo JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT
MISSION REPORT, supra note 63, at app. C, 100.
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Kosovo it remains of great cultural importance.66 After ten years of
Serb oppression, an ethnic cleansing campaign, an armed struggle,
and, perhaps, a narrowly averted genocide, the idea that the UN
would issue a decree requiring the Kosovar Albanians to continue to
live under Serb law was profoundly insulting to many Kosovars. To
the bureaucrats at UNMIK, the fact that the pre-1999 laws had been
promulgated by Serbs seemed purely academic - but to many
Kosovars, it was an offense to honor of the deepest sort.
It made no difference that UNMIK Regulation Number 1 said that
human-rights standards would trump the laws on the books in the'
event of a conflict. To the Kosovars, Serb law was Serb law, and they
wanted none of it. Nearly all of the fifty-five people sworn in
by UNMIK to serve as judges and prosecutors in UNMIK's new
"Emergency Judicial System" immediately declared that they would
not apply Serb law.
A crisis ensued, complete with angry editorials and dozens of
stormy meetings in Pristina, UN headquarters, the State Department,
and other sites. UNMIK refused to rescind Regulation 1. At the same
time, since most prosecutors and judges refused to accept Regulation
1, few judicial proceedings began in the makeshift courts. Most judges
insisted that the applicable law should by right be the laws in force
before 1989, since these laws were passed with the approval of the
Albanian-dominated Kosovo parliamentarians before the Serbs ended
Kosovo's autonomy. Some judges began to move forward with court
proceedings, but applying pre-1989 laws. Other judges applied an
eclectic mix of pre- and post-1989 laws. UNMIK continued to insist
that such actions were effectively illegal, but a few creative Kosovar
jurists noted that since the post-1989 laws were themselves arguably
illegal (since they were imposed by Belgrade after the dissolution of
the Kosovo parliament), they had never truly been legally applicable
in Kosovo, which meant that the pre-1989 laws in fact were the laws
applicable in Kosovo on March 22, 1999.
This particular controversy ended in defeat for UNMIK. Six
months after issuing Regulation 1, UNMIK (without comment) made
a full about-face in the form of UNMIK Regulation 24.67 This new
regulation declared that the law applicable in Kosovo would hence-
forth be the law in force on March 22, 1989, immediately prior to the
ending of Kosovar autonomy. Regulation 24 in fact permitted Kosovar
66. For a discussion of the idea of "honor" in Kosovar society, see Margaret Hasluck,
The Albanian Blood Feud, in LAW AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
CONFLICT 381 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1967). See also BLERIM REKA, ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT
PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION IN CODE OF LEKE DUKAGJINI [sic] (A COMPARATIVE
STUDY) (1997); Richard T. Oakes, The Albanian Blood Feud, 6 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 177
(1997).
67. UNMIK REGULATION No. 1999/24, reprinted in KOSOVO JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT
MISSION REPORT, supra note 63, at app. C, 110-11.
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judges to pick and choose whatever law they liked best: when the
pre-1989 laws failed to cover a given situation, Regulation 24 gave
judges the freedom to apply any nondiscriminatory legal provision
applicable in Kosovo after March 22, 1999. And, of course, all law
applied had to be consistent with international human-rights standards
- although Regulation 24, like Regulation 1, neglected to identify
sections of the law inconsistent with human-rights standards, or lay out
the procedures to be followed in the event of perceived conflict
between a provision of the law and human-rights standards.
This was not a trivial oversight. Ironically, the pre-1989 laws, so
dear to the Kosovar Albanian community, were far less consistent
with modern international human-rights standards than the post-1989
Serb law they had so vehemently rejected. The pre-1989 laws were
designed in the Communist era, before the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the advent of greater openness in Yugoslavia.68 Not only did the
pre-1989 laws fail to conform to international human-rights standards
in numerous ways, but the property- and civil-law regime they created
reflected a very different set of assumptions about how social life
should be organized than most Kosovars held a decade later. On their
face, the post-1989 Serb laws appeared to be an improvement on their
predecessors. They included a more modern understanding of private
property, and the criminal-law statutes covered war crimes and other
humanitarian-law violations, unlike earlier laws. It was primarily the
implementation of these post-1989 laws that had been discriminatory
and oppressive.6
This is a small example of how an overly formalistic approach to
law foundered when it came up against certain "irrational" but power-
ful cultural understandings. Although this dispute seems ludicrous in
many ways - after all, UNMIK only wanted to save everyone time
and effort by adapting the by-and-large decent law that was already in
use - its consequences were major. If UNMIK read the Kosovar
Albanian rejection of Regulation 1 as irrational and obstructionist, the
Kosovar Albanian community read UNMIK's initial refusal to take its
objections seriously as evidence both that the international community
had little respect for its history, fears, and aspirations, and as evidence
that the "rule of law," UNMIK-style, was little different from rule of
law, Milosevic-style. Furthermore, UNMIK's ultimate reversal on the
question of applying the pre-1989 laws suggested to the Kosovars that
law UNMIK-style was a matter of arbitrary decrees that could be
issued and reversed by an unaccountable, appointed bureaucracy.
UNMIK's law, therefore, need not have and should not have been
followed by lawyers or judges, much less by ordinary people.
68. For a readable history of Yugoslavia, see TIM JUDAH, THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTH
AND THE DESTRUCrION OF YUGOSLAVIA (2d ed. 2000).
69. See generally KOSOVO JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT, supra note 63.
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B. Self-Determination Versus Human Rights
The dispute over Regulation 1 was one small part of a larger
problem that plagued efforts to create the rule of law in Kosovo.
UNMIK could never entirely decide whether its ultimate goal was to
promote self-determination, or to promote and ensure human rights.
For that matter, UNMIK never truly confronted the question
of whether a commitment to human rights requires a commitment
to democratic decisionmaking, or what truly constitutes democratic
decisionmaking in a society with no obviously legitimate representa-
tives, or how to resolve crises in which majoritarian democracy
seemed likely to trample on minority and individual rights.7° These are
complex issues without easy answers, but UNMIK's failure to confront
them at all was particularly damaging given that UNMIK's whole
raison d'6tre in Kosovo involved protecting the Kosovars' right to
self-determination and promoting human rights. Indeed, NATO went
to war in Kosovo with the stated aim of protecting the Kosovars from
Serb domination and human-rights abuses.
UNMIK proved unable to come up with any coherent mechanism
for addressing these sometimes conflicting imperatives. In the early
days of the UN administration, UNMIK established a variety of
consultative bodies designed to include the Kosovars in decisions
about the all-important project of reestablishing the rule of law. The,
Judicial Advisory Council ("JAC") was created, as were the Interim
Advisory Council ("IAC"), and the Legislative Advisory Council
("LAC"). Including prominent Kosovar lawyers, academics, and
political figures, these bodies were meant to help appoint judges, revi-
talize legal education, and produce legal codes. But time and time
again, this consultative process foundered, as quarrels broke out over
substantive issues and over who should serve on the advisory bodies
(no clear criteria existed, and the different ethnic groups and political
parties clashed both with UNMIK and with each other over how to
divvy up the seats), and in what language the proceedings should be
conducted in. (The Serbs insisted on Serbian and the Albanians on
Albanian. Since the UN personnel generally spoke neither, this forced
meetings to include multiple translators, leading to further inefficiency.
and misunderstanding.)
The consultative process also faltered on more substantive issues:
not infrequently, for instance, Albanian participants would express the
view that there should be no Serb judges, as all Serbs were war crimi-
nals, or that the property code should give all Serbian property to
Albanians, since it had been stolen from them in the first place, even if
decades or centuries before, or that revenge killings of Serbs by
70. Cf Fiss, supra note 4 (discussing the inherent conflict between justice and auton-
omy, despite the tendency of human-rights discourse to conflate the two).
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Albanians should be treated more leniently than other kinds of kill-
ings.
Such disputes did not bode well for the due process of law that
UNMIK hoped to see emerge, and UNMIK responded by dismissing
its advisory councils and making key decisions itself. In other words,
when a majoritarian form of self-determination came up against
human rights, self-determination lost; and the sequence of events
leading to those decisions hardly looked like due process. Basically,
UNMIK wanted the decisionmaking process to be as participatory and
democratic as possible, but when the Kosovar participants came up
with suggestions or demands that UNMIK found unpalatable,
UNMIK simply dismissed them and made the decisions on its own.
Unsurprisingly, this did little to enhance UNMIK's reputation with the
Kosovars, as they saw UNMIK as increasingly arbitrary and
unaccountable in its rule. Ultimately, the advisory councils became
semipermanent battlegrounds, frequently dissolved by UNMIK, just
as frequently boycotted by one or more Kosovar or Serb groups, and
nearly always locked in angry paralysis.
C. Human Rights Versus "Law and Order"
In Regulation 1, UNMIK effectively incorporated international
human-rights standards into Kosovo's law, and this was affirmed in
Regulation 24. Although UNMIK's regulations never specified
precisely how to identify a norm of international human-rights law,
UNMIK legal advisers, other international actors, and Kosovars all
took "international human rights" to include, at a minimum, the core
rights at the heart of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the
European Charter, and decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights (since Kosovo was, after all, part of Europe, and the EU and
the OSCE both had major roles in Kosovo under the UNMIK
umbrella). Under each of these overlapping regimes, core rights
include (among others) the rights to equal protection, due process, fair
and expeditious judicial proceedings, freedom from arbitrary deten-
tion, adequate detention conditions, and representation by counsel.7
The police, prison, and judicial systems established by UNMIK
were unable to comply with those standards, however, or even with
the generally less-stringent standards that had been laid out in pre- or
post-1989 Kosovo, Serbian, and Yugoslavian law. An international
civilian police force for Kosovo got up and running only slowly, and to
this day functions poorly. In some regions of Kosovo, UN civilian
71. For a basic introductory text on core international human-rights principles and re-
gimes, see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2002).
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police from around the world apprehend suspects and investigate
crimes. In other regions, Kosovars who have gone through a basic
training course at a UN police school patrol the streets. In some areas,
NATO soldiers act as the police. In still other areas, all three share de
facto responsibility for policing. These various policing agents speak
different languages and apply widely varying methods in different
parts of Kosovo. As a result, they have been notoriously ineffective at
preventing crime or solving crimes in which suspects are not caught
red-handed. Moreover, since police procedures vary widely depending
on the nationality and experience levels of the police, NATO soldiers
and police in different areas apply widely differing standards for
stopping, questioning, and detaining suspects."
Detention facilities in Kosovo are equally variable. Most prewar
prisons were damaged by bombs or arson, and some detainees end up
in police holding cells or in NATO tents behind barbed wire. Few are
held in facilities that were purposely built for long-term detention,
which means that many detainees have no exercise areas, no health-
care facilities, no private visitation areas (or set standards for deter-,
mining when to allow access for visitors), and no access to legal mate-
rials. Few facilities allow full separation of men from women, juveniles
from adults, or pretrial detainees from convicted criminals. There are
few adequately trained prison and detention-facility guards, and
detention-facility officials have, in several well-publicized cases, been
unable to prevent ethnic violence among detainees, or escapes by well-
organized groups of prisoners assisted by outsiders.
Court resources vary as well. Most courts use Kosovar judges
appointed by the UN or the fledgling Kosovar government. Some
courts make partial use of international judges (who are paid more
than ten times as much as local counterparts, and given far better re-
sources and security, which unsurprisingly breeds resentment). Many
courts still lack law libraries or basic equipment. (Indeed, for many
judges the issue of applicable law remained moot for well over a year
after UNMIK took over. Until summer 2000, most Kosovar judges
lacked copies of either the pre- or post-1989 statutes, as well as copies
of international human-rights treaties, UNMIK regulations, and
European Court of Human Rights case law.) For eighteen months
after the NATO air campaign ended, most courts and prosecutors'
offices also lacked vehicles, office equipment, furniture, and full
staffs.73
As a result of resource limitations, unresolved jurisdictional issues,
and the dispute over the applicable law, most courts were slow to
72. See generally KOSOVO JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT, supra note 63.
73. See generally id. In the spring and summer of 2000, a $2 million grant from the U.S.
State Department's Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor ultimately rectified
some of these resource problems.
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begin hearing cases. In many areas, no judicial proceedings were held
at all for more than eight months after the beginning of the UNMIK
administration, and Kosovo's courts still face a formidable backlog
today. But NATO and UN civilian police ("CivPol") began arresting
criminal suspects as soon as they were deployed, since the restoration
of "law and order," in the sense of stopping the widespread violence,
was viewed as a key priority. For most of the first year of UNMIK
administration, NATO and CivPol resource limitations meant that
only those caught more or less red-handed while committing serious
crimes (rape, arson, kidnapping, murder) were actually apprehended;
most other suspects were given a warning and released immediately.
Nonetheless, within months after the UN administration started, sev-
eral hundred criminal suspects were detained in makeshift NATO and
UN jails. But for the most part, these detainees could not be tried or
even indicted since the courts were so slow. Although virtually any
straight reading of the applicable law (pre- or post-1989 Kosovo law,
European human-rights law, whatever) made it clear that detainees
could certainly not be held indefinitely without charge, many
detainees were not released, even though they were not charged ei-
ther.74 Some suspects were also detained pursuant to the UN Special
Representative's executive powers.75
The UN administration's commitment to upholding human rights
and the rule of law created another conundrum: holding people for
indefinite periods without charge was surely a problem under anyone's
reading of the law, but letting dangerous suspects - including a
number of people accused of war crimes - back out into the streets
also seemed unacceptable to NATO and UNMIK. Allowing criminals
to run free would undermine all of the UNMIK and NATO efforts to
restore order, reduce violence, and increase public confidence in the
international community's commitment to good governance in
Kosovo. UNMIK ultimately resolved this conundrum by issuing
UNMIK Regulation 26, which noted blithely that "in order to ensure
the proper administration of justice," pretrial detainees could be held
for a full year if they were suspected of serious crimes.76
Passage of this regulation did little to inspire confidence in the rule
of law in Kosovo. Many Kosovars and international observers claimed
that those suspects who were released (either through the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion or because a judge determined that they had
been held for excessive periods without charge) tended to be dispro-
portionately Albanians who either had "connections" to powerful
74. See id.
75. See LEGAL SYS. MONITORING SEC., supra note 25; DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
RULE OF LAW, supra note 25.
76. UNMIK REGULATION NO. 1999/26, reprinted in KOSOVO JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT
MISSION REPORT, supra note 63, at app. C, 112.
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people or who had committed revenge crimes against Serbs and other
minorities, while those who continued to be detained were often
minorities or those without powerful friends.
The story of missteps in creating the rule of law in Kosovo does
not end here - I could go on to discuss further and more recent
instances of ethnic bias, corruption, and intimidation in the courtroom,
prison escapes, and so on.77 But I think I have said enough to demon-
strate the perils of equating formalism with the substance of the rule
of law. Although UNMIK did its best to create all the formal trappings
of the rule of law,78 in the end it accomplished little and arguably
undermined the rule of law for years to come. When UNMIK set up
shop with 40,000 NATO troops, the Kosovars had just emerged from a
long period in which the law was no more than a naked instrument of
oppression - and UNMIK's inept approach to reestablishing the rule
of law sent the message that law is, indeed, an arbitrary and manipula-
ble thing, nothing that a person of integrity ought to heed. And in a
society such as Kosovo, in which other conflict-resolution tropes
exist - most notably, bloodfeud and outright war - such an inept
formalism ultimately undermines itself.
This should not be a surprise. Much of the psychological and socio-
legal work that has been done on why people obey the law reminds us
that rational-choice theory tells us only a very little bit about law-
abidingness. People may indeed weigh the risks and consequences of
getting caught as they consider whether to break the law, but factors
such as the perceived morality of the substantive law and the per-
ceived legitimacy and procedural fairness of legislative and judicial
processes are often of paramount importance in explaining why
people do (or do not) behave in accordance with law.79 In Kosovo,
virtually every factor that might create the rule of law broke down, and
UNMIK, because of its self-imposed limitations, proved incapable of
putting the pieces back into place. Even a purely rational actor could
certainly have concluded that despite NATO's overwhelming military
presence, the odds of actually being caught and punished for commit-
ting a crime were quite low.
More important than that, however, the law struck many Kosovars
as neither moral nor legitimate. In a society in which many people (by
no means all, but enough) took seriously the idea that revenge was not
77. See LEGAL SYS. MONITORING SEC., supra note 25 (detailing flaws in the Kosovo
justice system); DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW, supra note 25 (same).
78. UNMIK had assistance from numerous other actors, from the OSCE to the
American Bar Association's Central & East European Law Initiative.
79. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); see also Raymond
Paternoster, Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common Delin-
quency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 7 (1989)
(noting that moral beliefs were more central to decisions about whether to break the law
than assessments of the likelihood and seriousness of punishment).
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only excusable but perhaps even morally required," attempts to clamp
down on ethnically motivated revenge crimes and ensure equal
treatment for Albanians and Serbs struck many as unjust: Why, after
all, should the international community permit the Serbs to escape the
consequences of what many Kosovars saw as their (collectively) evil
actions? When the process for selecting law and deciding how to
reform legal institutions was so arbitrary, high-handed, and confused,
the basic criteria for legitimacy were unmet. Little wonder, then, that
efforts to create the rule of law in Kosovo have been so disappointing,
in ways that should give pause to those optimistic about the ongoing
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Do these Kosovo stories imply that changes in formal law never
matter? Not at all. In fact, in some societies, formal law very clearly
matters in a reasonably straightforward way to most people, most of
the time. In the U.S., for instance, where we basically share a substan-
tive normative commitment to the rule of law, changes in formal law
certainly affect our behavior, generally (although not always) in ways
that are possible to predict.81 If a judge orders a vote count stopped, it
stops. If a statute is declared unconstitutional, it will not be enforced.
If the law requires everyone to pay more in taxes, most of us groan,
but comply.
In such a context - where there is a preexisting and broad cultural
commitment to the amorphous bundle of values we call "the rule of
law" - it makes perfect sense to see the law as an instrument of social
change. Although the precise effect of changes in the formal law is
often difficult to measure, it is probably correct to believe that changes
in the law have helped bring about real changes in our society: changes
in how minorities are treated, changes in the degree to which women
are truly able to participate as equal citizens, changes in the distribu-
tion of wealth, and so on. 2 In such a context, too, "reforms" designed
to make courts more independent and to make legislation more
consistent and up to date and to improve court administration find
fertile ground, and may make precisely the difference they are de-
signed to make.
In the U.S., then, formal law matters, and the same could certainly
be said for Canada, most of Western Europe, and many other coun-
80. See Hasluck, supra note 66, at 382-83 (noting that revenge was not considered a
choice but some sort of transgenerational duty); see also Oakes, supra note 66.
81. In any society in which the rule of law does exist in a substantive sense, norms and
law are interconnected. As anthropologist Lawrence Rosen notes, "[Liaw is preeminently an
artifact of culture: it is influenced by and constitutive of the way in which the members of a
society comprehend their actions towards one another and infuse those actions with an air of
immanent and superordinate worth." Rosen, supra note 59, at 542.
82. But see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that the changes in the law reflect, rather than
cause, cultural change).
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tries around the globe, from Japan to Costa Rica to Botswana.
Nonetheless, even in these societies, formal law almost certain matters
less (and in more complicated ways) than lawyers and legal academics
may like to think. As many legal realists have noted, what really goes
on in the office of the divorce lawyer or the insurance salesman
certainly has something to do with "the law" and with legal institu-
tions, but that something is not always what we think; individuals and
groups understand the law in different ways, and organize their affairs
in ways that sometimes reflect the law, sometimes subvert it, and
sometimes barely connect to it at all 3. The recent work of Robert
Ellickson has reinforced this message: the law's shadow is sometimes
distorted, and often simply irrelevant to the bargaining process.'
Consider also the Kosovo-like societies within the United States:
the many inner-city communities, for instance, that are simultaneously
oversaturated with law (in its most coercive manifestations) and that
at the same time least resemble any robust conception of societies in
which the rule of law prevails. The punitive measures of the "war on
drugs" - along with the legacy of racism and police brutality - have
left some impoverished minority communities in America disdainful
of the idea of the rule of law,85 and have created an environment in
which alternative means of organizing social life and ordering violence
(such as gangs) may appeal to increasing numbers of citizens.'
Even in the United States, formal law matters only in ways more
complex and inconsistent than we would like to think. If the relation-
ship between formal law and substantive normative commitments -
the relationship between formal law and cultural assumptions and
behavior - is quirky and complicated even in the U.S., a nation that
prides itself in having been built upon the idea of law's supremacy,
how much more quirky and complicated is that relationship in
Kosovo, in Sierra Leone, in Russia, in East Timor, in Afghanistan, or
in Iraq, all places where formal law has been so utterly discredited.
83. See generally JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG
WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Judith N.
Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and
Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & SOC. REV. 93 (1986); Barbara Yngvesson,
"Kidstuff' and Complaint: Interpreting Resistance in a New England Court, in CONTESTED
STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE 138 (Mindie Lazarus Black & Susan F. Hirsch
eds., 1994).
84. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETrLE
DISPUTES (1991).
85. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement
and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219 (2000).
86. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, THE CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE
AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 1-2 (1999); PHILIPPE BOURGOIS, IN SEARCH OF
RESPECT: SELLING CRACK IN EL BARRIO (1996).
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The complex and sometimes tenuous relation between formal law and
normative commitments that we find in the United States turns out to
be culturally contingent and not generally exportable in any simple
way. In societies that lack a strong and shared substantive commit-
ment to the rule of law, changes in the formal law are likely to have
little effect on people's behavior. 7
To put it a little differently, what we have is a serious chicken-and-
egg problem: we know, more or less, that given certain widely shared
normative commitments in a given society, formal law can lead to
changes in cultural assumptions and behavior. But when such
normative commitments are not widely shared, changes in formal law
and the structure of legal institutions are likely to have little real
impact. The paradox is that when people already believe law matters,
it will matter; when people think law doesn't matter, it never can, and
it is unclear how to go from the latter state to the former.'
III. LAW, ORDER, AND VIOLENCE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATIONSHIP
Thus far, this Article has argued that international efforts to
promote the rule of law tend to focus on changes in formal law and
legal institutions, despite the lack of evidence to suggest that formalis-
tic changes will lead reliably to changed normative commitments
within a given community. In the context of Kosovo, I have suggested
that such formalistic efforts may have actually undermined interna-
tional attempts to create the rule of law, since UNMIK combined its
formalistic approach with ignorance of local preferences, high-
handedness when expressed local preferences failed to conform with
UNMIK values, inconsistent messages, and, at times, sheer incompe-
tence. But the problem goes even deeper, because recent international
and U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law have been based on
fundamentally flawed assumptions about the relationship between
law, order, and violence.
The implicit assumptions about law, order, and violence at the root
of most rule-of-law promotion efforts run something like this:
"We need the rule of law in crisis-ridden societies such as Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone - as well as in
87. Rosen notes that this requires us to recognize the limits of law in constituting com-
munities and influencing norms and behavior: "law may be quite central or quite secondary
depending on the issue." Rosen, supra note 59, at 543.
88. Cf. KAHN, supra note 2, at 36:
The rule of law is a social practice: it is a way of being in the world. To live under the rule of
law is to maintain a set of beliefs about the self and community, time and space, authority
and representation. It is to understand the actions of others and the possible actions of the
self as expressions of these beliefs. Without these beliefs, the rule of law appears as just
another form of coercive governmental authority.
June 2003] 2301
HeinOnline -- 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2301 2002-2003
Michigan Law Review
more stable places such as Russia and Guatemala - because the rule
of law is essential to ensure that society functions in an orderly,
predictable fashion. Without law, there will be violence and disorder.
Where there is violence, there is disorder, and where there is disorder,
there is violence. But disorder and violence are bad for human rights,
bad for commerce, and a threat to international security. Rational
people dislike chaos, violence, and suffering, and they like peace, pre-
dictability, and economic prosperity. Therefore, rational people desire
the rule of law, since law brings order, reduces violence and suffering,
and enables prosperity."89
There are two problems with these assumptions, the second more
profound than the first. The first problem is that even if these assump-
tions are basically valid, serious collective-action problems arise in
most postcrisis or "transitional" societies. The second problem is that
most of our standard assumptions about the relationship between law,
order, and violence cannot be justified at all. Law has no inherent
ability to reduce violence or suffering, and what is more, some of the
time at least, people actively prefer violence and suffering to peace
and prosperity.
A. Collective Action and Conflict Entrepreneurs
The first problem is fairly straightforward. Even if we accept the
notion that in the long run all rational people desire peace and order,
in the short run some people profit greatly from disorder and from
violence. Such people can be dubbed "conflict entrepreneurs."' The
people who profit from disorder and violence may be most reluctant
to see the rule of law emerge triumphant, since the rule of law threat-
ens their position and profits - and in extreme cases may place them
in serious physical jeopardy, if they are prosecuted for crimes commit-
ted during the period of violence and disorder.
Thus, in Kosovo, Hashim Thaqi's Kosova Liberation Army
("KLA" or, in Albanian, "UQK") was often (and accurately) accused
by UNMIK and other international authorities of sabotaging rule-of-
law promotion efforts by keeping stockpiles of illegal weapons, com-
mitting or encouraging politically motivated killings, and intimidating
89. For example, Richard Fallon describes the core values underlying most descriptions
of the rule of law; he suggests that most commentators view a central purpose of the rule of
law as protecting against "anarchy and the Hobbesian war of all against all." Fallon, supra
note 40, at 8.
90. See Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace,
Events: Combating Conflict Entrepreneurs (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://www.ceip.org/files/events/
events.asp?p=1&EventlD=453. "Conflict entrepreneurs" may simply profit from violence
and disorder; at other times, they may create a new violent order themselves, offering "pro-
tection" to those who cooperate in their activities.
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judges into ruling in their favor.91 For the KLA, such a strategy made
perfect sense: the KLA had been politically marginal in prewar
Kosovo, sidelined by Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of
Kosovo, which emphasized nonviolent resistance to Serbian oppres-
sion. In the years leading up to the NATO intervention, the
KLA launched small-scale attacks on Serb targets (both military and
civilian). It was labeled a terrorist group by many in the international
community, but it slowly began to attract followers, mostly rural,
mostly young, and mostly male.
Violent and disproportionate Serbian retaliation for KLA attacks
created KLA martyrs - including civilians massacred indiscriminately
by Serb forces - and the KLA gained more popular sympathy.
During the NATO bombing campaign, the KLA recruited thousands
of young men eager to avoid remaining passively in refugee camps and
critical of Rugova's equivocal role during the conflict. Supported by
generous financing from the Kosovar Albanian diaspora, KLA forces
inflicted an unknown but probably substantial amount of damage on
Serbian troops in Kosovo. As the only anti-Serb military force on the
ground, the KLA was in frequent contact with NATO, which stopped
just short of arming the KLA but provided tacit support by coordi-
nating bombing attacks with KLA leaders.
When "peace" returned, however, the KLA's brash young fighters
found the rug had been pulled out from under them. Initially hailed as
heroes by other Kosovars for their wartime conduct, KLA fighters
sought to transform themselves into a viable political force. They
urged UNMIK to treat the KLA as the legitimate and effective (if
unelected) government of Kosovo, the only group capable of adminis-
tering and controlling Kosovo's villages. But NATO and UNMIK
wanted to negotiate with older, clearer-headed Kosovars, not with
young men mere steps away from terrorism, and Rugova reasserted
his claim to be the moral leader of the Kosovars.
As it lost ground politically, the KLA found itself struggling to
hold onto the power and wealth it had gained during the conflict.
Organized crime quickly proved a natural and lucrative arena for the
KLA, and soon the KLA could be relied upon to support the rule of
law half-heartedly, at best. Without the rule of law, the KLA could
have guns, power, and money, maintaining control by bribery and
intimidation. Individual KLA supporters would have access to lucra-
tive positions, fine houses taken from Serbs or from "uncooperative"
Kosovars, and plenty of money and opportunities to offer their
91. See Gregory Piatt, KFOR Trying to Crack Organized Crime Ring, STARS & STRIPES
(Wash., D.C.), Nov. 28, 2000, available at http://ww2pstripes.osd.mil/article.asp?section=104
section&article=5236&archive=true; see also Erin Schultz, The UN in Kosovo: The Potential
for Justice, PROSPECTUS (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.),
Spring 2000, at http://www.csis.org/pubs/prospectus/00springSchultz.html.
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families. The rule of law, in contrast, offered few short-term attrac-
tions. With the rule of law, many KLA soldiers would return to the
state they were in before the conflict: no jobs, no means of income, no
power, no future.
Even aside from the KLA, there were plenty of other Kosovars for
whom the rule of law was unattractive in the short term. Many
ordinary people who did not particularly support the KLA were
nonetheless reluctant to turn over stockpiled weapons to NATO and
UNMIK, reluctant to use the new courts, and inclined to take law into
their own hands. Few Kosovars believed that NATO and UNMIK
could or would protect them if things went wrong, and to many,
involving NATO or UNMIK in a dispute over a violent crime or a,
property matter seemed like an excellent way to become enmeshed in
red tape, more or less forever, while one's enemies prospered. Some
ordinary Kosovars "acquired" cars or houses or appliances during the
chaos; all of these people stood to lose a great deal if the rule of law
were truly restored. And for those who had lost a house or a relative,
informal kin and friendship networks often led to the KLA, which
might remedy a loss in exchange for support. Why have faith in the
rule of law when organized crime and the KLA offered a more
reliable way to solve problems?92
Much of this, of course, was beyond the control of UNMIK and
NATO. It might well be that if NATO and the UN had moved more
aggressively to police the borders, confiscate illegal weapons, detain
criminal suspects (not just those caught red-handed in the commission
of the most serious crimes), create new jobs in rural and urban areas,
and set up an effective system for reclaiming stolen property and
compensating people for wartime economic losses, ordinary Kosovars
would have been more willing to support the rule of law and the
KLA's incentive structure would have shifted as legitimate opportuni-
ties opened up. But although sheer incompetence hindered UNMIK
efforts at times, UNMIK and NATO were both captive to the interests
92. Historically, groups like the KLA may well have been the precursors of numerous
respectable national governments. As Charles Tilly notes, the notion of the statemakers as
coercive and entrepreneurial is more accurate than the vision of a social contract:
War makes states .... Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing and war making all belong
on the same continuum .... To the extent that the threats against which a given government
protects its citizens... are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized
a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even
fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of
governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citi-
zens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers.
Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in BRINGING THE STATE
BACK IN 169, 170-71 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985). In Kosovo, there is little doubt that
the KLA turned to straightforward racketeering - but unlike UNMIK's attempt to regulate
behavior, extract taxes, etc., the KLA's racketeering was both more transparent and more
competent from the vantage point of many Kosovars. Little wonder that the KLA seemed a
more viable governing force to many.
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of their member states - and like all UN entities, UNMIK was only
as effective as UN member states were willing to let it be; NATO
troops, in turn, were only as effective as NATO member states
allowed. The U.S., Britain, France, Russia, and other key players kept
NATO and UNMIK too limited in resources and mandate to be effec-
tive. To some extent, then, it was inevitable that efforts to create the
rule of law in Kosovo would fall far short of the mark.
Such collective-action problems are not unique to Kosovo. They
plague most transitional and postcrisis societies, since there will always
be those who reap short-term profit from violence and disorder. In
Afghanistan, for instance, the U.S.-backed warlords of the Northern
Alliance are currently a larger threat to security and the rule of law on
the ground than the Taliban or al Qaeda. For many ordinary Afghans,
warlordism is a disaster, but for the warlords, warlordism works excep-
tionally well. With profits from the opium trade and illegal-weapons
trade, Afghan warlords and their clients fare far better now than they
conceivably would in a peaceful, democratic Afghanistan.93 In Iraq, we
see early indications of the same phenomena, as individuals and
groups rush to take advantage of the current leadership vacuum,
seeking profit, revenge, or political power.94
B. The Lure of Violence
Standard assumptions about the relationship between law, order,
and violence often overlook the kinds of short-term, collective-action
problems described in the preceding section, but they also suffer from
a more profound flaw. To put it bluntly, contrary to much legal
mythologizing, there is little correlation between law, order, and
violence. This is in part because many people value moral meaning
more than they value safety and prosperity." As a result, for some
people, in some places, some of the time, violence and suffering are
actually more attractive than peace and prosperity, not simply because
violence offers a chance to gain power and wealth, but because killing
93. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Afghanistan: After Bombs Must Come Civil Rights,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at M1; see also Ahmadi, supra note 16; Afghanistan Weekly
Situation Reports 1, supra note 16; Afghanistan Weekly Situation Reports II, supra note 16.
94. See, e.g., Jason Burke, The Struggle for Power: Arabs Flee the Revenge of the Kurds,
OBSERVOR (London), Apr. 20, 2003, at 14, available at http://www.observer.guardian.\co.uk/
international/story/0,6903,940160,00.html; Paul McGeough, Chaos Reigns in a Land of Fear
and Revenge, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 12, 2003, available at http://www.smh.com.
au/articles/2003/04/11/1049567875707.
95. Cf KAHN, supra note 2, at 5. Kahn notes:
It may be that any state that wants to participate in the new, international economic regime
will have to order itself under [a Western] conception of the rule of law. Doing so may very
well bring an increase in material benefits to that community. Whether it will produce a life
as full of meaning as the alternatives is an open question.
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(or dying) for a cause can seem far more important - indeed, more
appealing - than mere survival or acquiring wealth. Are such prefer-
ences "rational"? Perhaps not, but such preferences can certainly be
powerful.96
The myth we tell ourselves about law still owes a great deal to
Hobbes. From a Hobbesian perspective, law is necessary because
a world without law is a world of pervasive and uncontrollable
violence.97 In this view - shared, to one degree or another, by most
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment legal theorists - law arises as
a response and an alternative to violence. Indeed, many would assert
that law is the very antithesis of violence, since law seeks to create a
system of social order and moral meaning based upon reason rather
than brute force.9"
Empirically, there is little reason to believe this is true, at least if
we consider law in the formal sense99 (and, as I have already argued,
most rule-of-law promotion efforts are premised on a deeply formalis-
tic understanding of law"°). In fact, empirically there seems to be little
correlation at all between law, in the formal sense, and order and vio-
lence.
Consider several brief examples:
Order without law: In his study of cattle-related disputes in rural
Shasta County, California, Bob Ellickson explicitly took on Hobbes's
equation of anarchy with chaos. In Shasta County, the laws governing
wandering livestock were unknown to most residents. To the extent
that county residents were aware of relevant laws, they often
96. Recent events in the Middle East underline this, as do the events of September 11.
For a discussion of this general phenomenon in the context of consumerist capitalism versus
religious and tribal fundamentalism, see BARBER, supra note 57.
97. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 185 (Penguin English Library 1981) (1651)
("Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of
every man, against every man."). In the state of war, Hobbes writes, there is "worst of all,
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short." Id. at 186. Although Locke and many others modified this bleak view,
the basic assumptions remained the same: men enter society to avoid the state of war.
98. Of course, as Robert Cover, Austin Sarat, and many others have pointed out, law
also relies on violence for its efficacy. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
L.J. 1601 (1986); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, A Journey Through Forgetting: Toward
a Jurisprudence of Violence, in THE FATE OF LAW 209 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1993). For Cover, Sarat, and their intellectual progeny, this raises a troubling question:
Is the violence of the law really any different from the violence that the law claims to pre-
vent and combat?
99. If we choose to think of law in a less formal sense, we risk assuming what we need to
prove. That is, if we start from the premise that law is a set of normative commitments, and a
set of functioning institutions that relate to violence in particular ways, we beg the question
of how and why certain formal institutions come to be accompanied by certain sets of nor-
mative commitments.
100. Or they are premised on an assumption that the forms of law will lead reliably to
substantive commitments to the rule of law.
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misunderstood the nature of the laws in significant ways, and the laws
rarely influenced people's behavior. Indeed, Ellickson noted, "large
segments of social life [were] located and shaped beyond the reach of
law.".... Nonetheless, Shasta County was, by and large, a peaceable,
orderly place, although little law was in evidence, and even the shadow
of the law was rarely evident. Indeed, strong norms favoring coopera-
tion, nonhierarchical coordination, and "neighborliness" prevailed and
actively discouraged the use of centralized, legalistic solutions to
problems involving straying livestock.
112
Nazism and the "order of terror":0 3 In Hitler's Germany, there
was a superfluity of formal law: no matter was too large or too small to
be minutely regulated, and some scholars have in fact attributed the
Holocaust to deeply rooted German cultural attitudes towards law and
authority." In the purely positivist sense, the Nuremberg laws and
ultimately the death camps were all "legal,"'' 5 and the death camps
themselves were triumphs of orderly murder, complete with roll calls,
parades, inmate numbers tattooed upon flesh, and minutely detailed
records. Law was pervasive and order rigidly maintained; yet both the
law and the order coexisted comfortably with the most appalling
violence and suffering, deliberately inflicted. Here, law and order not
only failed to decrease violence - they were intimately and causally
bound up with horrific violence."
Urban America and the "code of the street": Consider certain
American inner-city communities in the 1980s and 1990s. Marred by
poverty, crime, and violence, such communities were seen by many
outsiders as nests of disorder, areas in which ordinary behavioral rules
did not apply, and outbreaks of illegal violence could be as unpredict-
101. See ELLICKSON, supra note 84, at 4.
102. See id.
103. See WOLFGANG SOFSKY, THE ORDER OF TERROR: THE CONCENTRATION CAMP
(1993).
104. See, e.g., DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS:
ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1997).
105. This caused something of a dilemma for the architects of the Nuremberg trials, who
had to resort to rather vague notions of custom and usage to respond to the objection that
prosecuting Germans for their acts violated the principle of legality.
106. See SOFSKY, supra note 103. Many have objected to a positivistic or formalistic un-
derstanding of law precisely because it can both coexist with and enable extreme brutality
and suffering. Consider the famous Milgram experiments, in which college students were
told to inflict what they thought were painful and even potentially lethal electric shocks on
others. For the most part, the student subjects of the experiments were entirely willing to
inflict what they believed to be terrible pain on others, once they had been assured that
doing so was "part of the experiment." The authority of those running the experiment al-
lowed the students to displace any anxiety or guilt about hurting others in the same way that
law under the Nazis presumably played a critical role in enabling ordinary Germans to shrug
off their fears that the treatment of Jews was wrong: if the law dictated it, then it must be all
right. Milgram's experiments are discussed in Sarat & Kearns, supra note 98.
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able as they were lethal."7 Nonetheless, such communities were filled
with "law." Indeed, as I have already noted, they were oversaturated
with law in its most coercive manifestations. The criminal law remains
a daily presence in many poor urban communities, extending its long
arm through the war on drugs and, more recently, the war on gangs. In
part as a result, America's prisons are populated disproportionately by
young, black men from inner-city areas. 8 But despite the irreducible
centrality of law, such communities remained, from the perspective of
outsiders, stubbornly prone to violence. Even with nearly a fourth of
young black men in prison at one point or another, the violence
(some, but not all, drug-related) continued more or less unchecked.0 9
In this setting, law, though omnipresent and overtly coercive, has
proven utterly unable to fulfil its promise to replace and minimize
violence. If anything, the law may have even increased certain kinds of
oppositional violence: law became so discredited that illegal violence
took on its own mystique for some people."0
Despite the violence, there was also plenty of order in even the
most "dysfunctional" inner-city American communities, although the
nature of the order was far from apparent to most outsiders (and
bewildered some insiders as well). By and large, even the violence in
inner-city communities followed certain widely understood rules:
there was "good" and "bad" violence, heroic violence and shameful
violence, violence that was easily understood as following inevitably
from certain kinds of competitions, challenges, and transgressions. To
the (mostly young) men and women at the center of the violence,
the violence was sometimes exhilarating, sometimes appalling, but
generally perfectly intelligible and predictable."'
This widespread extralegal violence contrasts with the situation in
Nazi Germany, where almost unimaginable violence was an integral
and carefully planned part of the legal order. Under the Nazis, law
107. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 86.
108. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNITED STATES: PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (June 2000), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2000/usa/.
109. The recent decline in urban crime rates is more plausibly attributed to shifting
demographics and economic patterns than to the changed legal framework. See JEREMY
TRAVIS & MICHELLE WAUL, URBAN INST., REFLECTIONS ON THE CRIME DECLINE:
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE? (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
410546_CrimeDecline.pdf.
110. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 86.
111. See id. at 1-2. Anderson notes that:
In some of the most economically depressed and drug- and crime-ridden pockets of the
city ... a "code of the street" often holds sway. At the heart of this code is a set of prescrip-
tions and proscriptions, or informal rules, of behavior organized around a desperate search
for respect that governs public social relations, especially violence, among so many residents,
particularly young men and women.
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created extreme order, and it also (not coincidentally) created
unprecedented kinds of violence and suffering, all wholly "legal." In
some American inner-city communities, by contrast, law has utterly
failed to constrain illegal violence, and may indeed have encouraged
extralegal violence through its crudeness and inequity. Meanwhile,
order has nonetheless emerged - although that order has everything
to do with violence, and little to do with "law."
Bloodfeuds and martyrs: In nineteenth-century Albania, there was
effectively no central government. "2 There were no legislatures, no
statutes, no courts, no police, and no prisons. Albania was a violent
land; murders were frequent, and from time to time bloodfeuds
depopulated whole villages. But although law was absent, and violence
pervasive, Albanian society was both exceptionally egalitarian..3 and
extremely well-ordered. No social or economic elites held even a near-
monopoly on violence or the means of production, and the violence
itself followed an elaborate system of rules laid out in oral tradition
(and eventually recorded by a monk as the "Code of Lek" or the
"Kanun of Leke"). The oral tradition associated with the Code of Lek
laid out rules governing numerous aspects of social behavior, from
marriage and family relations to murder, revenge, and compensation.
Crucial to the entire code was the notion of honor."4 Without
honor, life was not worth living; a man without honor was socially
"dead." ''1 The primary way for the dishonored to be restored to honor
was through revenge, and the Code of Lek offered detailed guidelines
for responding to various degrees of insult and injury. Revenge was
never to be arbitrary or excessive; the Code specified the precise ways
in which revenge might be taken, and outlined the limits on revenge
and the etiquette of revenge (for example, revenge could not be taken
on women, except in certain specified and exceptional circumstances;
also, the relatives of the dead must be notified in certain specified
ways and times that their loved one had been murdered"6). By and
112. See Hasluck, supra note 66.
113. Among ethnically Albanian men, at least. See id.
114. See id. at 382-83. The Albanian bloodfeud was not dissimilar from bloodfeud tradi-
tions in Icelandic, Somalian, Berber, and Chechen cultures. See, e.g., WILLIAM IAN MILLER,
BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990);
see also ANATOL LIEVEN, CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER (1998). Some
scholars have suggested that modern law emerged from the bloodfeud (certainly the laws of
war emerged from a conception of war as an obligation linked to ideas of honor). See
A.W.B. Simpson, The Agincourt Campaign and the Law of War, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 653
(1995) (reviewing THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW OF WAR IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (1993)).
115. See Oakes, supra note 66, at 220.
116. For instance, the Code of Lek states:
The murderer, if he is able to do so himself, turns the victim over on his back. If he can, well
and good; if not, he must tell the first person he meets to turn the victim over on his back
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large, most nineteenth-century Albanians seem to have taken the
Code of Lek quite seriously, and obeyed it to at least the same degree
to which modern Americans obey the law. When transgressions
occurred, they were punished by social disapproval - and in extreme
cases, by collective punishments, shaming rituals, or exile from the
community.'17 In nineteenth-century Albanian society, there was no
law in the modern formalistic sense - no courts, no legislatures, and
so on - but one finds plenty of order, albeit a violent order.
The cult of martyrdom promulgated by some extremist Islamic
organizations such as Hamas and al Qaeda presents similar issues.
Those who are willing both to kill and die on behalf of their religion
are people who (more or less by definition) disobey earthly laws in
order to be obedient to a higher law. As in bloodfeud cultures, some
people in such extremist cultures value honor or religion over life.
Although formal law may be minimal or ignored, the violence that
exists is orderly, intelligible, and in fact may appear laudable when
seen from within the perspective of extremist religious belief."8
"Anarchy" and state dissolution: State structures never truly
existed in nineteenth-century Albania. If we look at a more recent
example of state structures that existed and then imploded, we see
similar developments. In Somalia in the early 1990s, state dissolution
was rapid and experienced by many Somalis as chaotic. Nevertheless,
although state structures remain nonexistent in most of Somalia,
"disorder" was short-lived in the sense that people rapidly fell back
both on older modes of social organization (based on lineage and clan
loyalty, in some cases, and on Islam in other cases) and on newer
modes of social organization that became suddenly useful.119 Levels of
violence remained high in postdissolution Somalia, but for most
Somalis, the violence itself became ordered and predictable within a
relatively short time. 2 ° (The same could be said for Kosovo after the
NATO air campaign ended: a period of chaos ensued, but Kosovar so-
ciety rapidly became orderly again, although the nature of the order
was violent.)
For some Somalis, life after the dissolution of the state was more'
dangerous and less pleasant than before; for others - including many
and place his weapon near his head. The murderer may not dare to take the victim's weapon.
If he commits such a dishonorable act, he incurs two blood-feuds.
Code of Lek, quoted in Oakes, supra note 66, at 192; see also Hasluck, supra note 66, at 389.
117. See Hasluck, supra note 66; see also REKA, supra note 66.
118. Cf. BARBER, supra note 57; Barbara Ehrenreich & Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, A
Twisted Sense of Duty and Love, PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 2001, at 10.
119. See Anna Simons, Somalia and the Dissolution of the Nation-State, 96 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 818 (1994); see also William Finnegan, Letter from Mogadishu: A World
of Dust, NEW YORKER, Mar. 20, 1995, at 64.
120. See Simons, supra note 119.
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of the young fighters employed by clan warlords - life in
postdissolution Somalia was markedly better than it had been before.
For most people, life went on somehow or other; as Bill Finnegan
noted in a 1995 New Yorker article, "[E]ven while Somalia has no
government, a great deal of political decision-making does get done,
most of it ... indistinguishable from what goes on ... when there is a
government. '121 As a result, in postdissolution Somalia, ordinary peo-
ple continued to have children, celebrate marriages, observe religious
rituals, start businesses, borrow and repay debts, teach their children,
and invest in the future - even while clan warfare continued
unabated around them. In postdissolution Somalia, then, as in
Albania, the absence of law coexisted with both order and a great deal
of violence.
C. The Moral Meaning of Violence
What should we make of all this? First, we should probably
conclude that "order" is the default setting in human societies. All
societies go through periods of genuine chaos and rapid change,
caused sometimes by natural disaster, sometimes by war, sometimes
by economic collapse. During these periods, social relations may be
disrupted, institutions may collapse, and old modes of interacting may
rapidly become irrelevant or impossible. But even in the midst of
"chaos," patterns can usually be found: modes of interaction that
122persist in times of crisis, and new modes of interaction that emerge
rapidly to fill gaps created by the collapse of old institutions and
customs.
As anthropologist Anna Simons suggests, it may be there is "an
organization to dissolution" itself,'23 and that disorder and dissolution
are best viewed "as the liminal phase between two segments of
order and structure. ' 124 Nature abhors a vacuum, and humans abhor
disorder. It is probably in the nature of human beings to create order
as quickly as possible, since total unpredictability makes species sur-
vival difficult. Human societies appear able to carry on for long
periods of time with astronomically high levels of violence and suffer-
ing, as long as there is at least some reasonable degree of predictability
and pattern to the violence.
If order is the default mode for human societies, however, it is
almost certainly wrong to imagine that formal law (in the modern
121. Finnegan, supra note 119, at 70.
122. See John Davis, The Anthropology of Suffering, 5 J. REFUGEE STUD. 149 (1992).
123. Simons, supra note 119, at 822; see also PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO
INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES
FROM RWANDA (1998).
124. See Simons, supra note 119, at 822.
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sense of statutes, courts, and legislatures) has much of anything to do
with order. The examples I have just given strongly suggest that as
long as there is not a constant barrage of disastrous and unpredictable
external events, human societies will find patterned ways to organize
themselves to allow planning and predictability. They will use custom,
rituals, habits, cooperative behavior, and sometimes force - but order
will almost certainly emerge, law or no law. As Bob Ellickson rightly
suggests, this should give pause to those who imagine that the modern
regulatory state is the only possible way to successfully organize
human society.125
Of course, not all types of "order" are equal. A high degree of
order is entirely consistent with extraordinary amounts of violence and
suffering, and to say that order will inevitably emerge from periods of
chaos says nothing about the degree or distribution of suffering. 26 In
Nazi Germany, order (and plenty of law) coexisted with appalling suf-
fering, differentially distributed to affect Jews and various other
"undesirables," such as gypsies, communists, and homosexuals.' In
nineteenth-century Albania, women had little role in public life, and
had simply to accept the bloodfeuds that could ultimately claim all'
their male kin; "outsiders" such as gypsies and foreigners were entirely
marginalized. 27 In Shasta County cattle disputes, there was little
violence or suffering, but as Ellickson's work implicitly suggests, the
order that existed benefited some more than others. Thus, "newcom-
ers" were more likely to turn to formal law, since they lacked other
means of penetrating a tightly knit social network and resolving
disputes collaboratively. 2 In postwar Kosovo, ethnic Albanian men
125. See ELLICKSON, supra note 84, at 4.
126. Some of the early law-and-economics literature on the role of social norms can
seem rather Panglossian at times, assuming that free of interference from meddling
governmental actors, groups will naturally develop ways of interacting that are not only or-
derly but presumably work well for all involved. Although little of the literature on law and
norms draws upon the classics of social anthropology, this Panglossian tendency was com-
mon in early functionalist anthropological works - and has been roundly criticized since
then. Contrast Bronislaw Malinowski's emphasis on coordination and reciprocity in "primi-
tive" societies, BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION 186 (1947), with
Edmund Leach's scathing critique. Leach writes:
[T]he functionalists always try to have it both ways. If the manifest overt purpose of a cus-
tom is to emphasize values of which the anthropologist himself approves - e.g., social cohe-
sion, the liberty of the subject, fair shares for all - then this aspect of the custom will be
stressed; if on the other hand the manifest form of the custom runs contrary to the anthro-
pologist's own ethic - e.g., customs involving feud, murder, rebellion, torture, etc. - then
an intricate piece of special pleading will be introduced which will "demonstrate" that the
custom in question is not what it seems; that the actual, as distinct from the apparent,
outcome of the institution is social cohesion, liberty of the subject, etc.
Edmund Leach, Law as a Condition of Freedom, in THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN
ANTHROPOLOGY 74, 82 (David Bidney et al. eds., 1963).
127. See Hasluck, supra note 66.
128. Cf. David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Inju-
ries in an American Community, in CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY
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with guns thrived; others (especially in minority groups) suffered
enormously. In Somalia, people with close ties to powerful clans did
rather better than others.29 In some American inner cities, the violent
order that has been created by gangs may be experienced as positive
by those young men who find status and wealth through gang affilia-
tions and conflicts, but older citizens and many women experience the
violence as debilitating and painful, making bringing up children and
going to work exceptionally difficult. 30
It should also be evident that the presence or absence of formal
law has as little to do with violence as it has to do with order. Like
order, law can coexist with extreme violence, and the existence of law
tells us little about how violence and suffering are distributed within
society. As the most cursory dip into the rich ethnographic literature
on stateless societies suggests, lack of formal legal structures can be
accompanied by equitable and peaceful forms of social organization,
equitable and violent forms of social organization, peaceful but inequi-
table forms of social organization, and forms of social organization
that are both violent and inequitable. Similarly, societies possessing
the full legal apparatus of the modern state can be organized in a very
wide range of ways.
But if law is not creating order or reducing violence, what is it
doing? The answer is that law is simply one of the many mechanisms
human beings have developed to give moral meaning to violence.
Every human society experiences some degree of conflict and
suffering; the central question for each society is how to make sense of
the kinds of violence and suffering that occur.
In societies without law in the modern sense, myths, customs, and
rituals give moral meaning to violence. They tell people that killing a
relative is bad, but killing an "enemy" from another group is good, or
that death in battle is blessed, while death through illness is shameful,
or that illness is sent by God to test a person's mettle, or is caused by
witchcraft and must be avenged, or that a brave person turns the other
cheek. There are as many ways to organize and make sense of violence
and suffering as there have been human societies in the world.
IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS 27 (1994). Engel notes that in Sander County, Illinois, old-
time residents filtered anxieties about an influx of immigrants into their town through con-
cerns about excessive personal-injury litigation. Newcomers were indeed more likely to turn
to litigation to resolve disputes, but not out of any inherent litigiousness. The newer, poorer,
ethnically different, and more marginal residents of the town lacked an alternative social
safety net arising out of strong family and social networks. For them, litigation was a sign of
exclusion from a cohesive and cooperative social system, and represented the only means of
getting help when injuries occurred. See Carol J. Greenhouse, Interpreting American Liti-
giousness, in HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 252 (June Starr & Jane F. Collier eds., 1989). See generally ELLICKSON,
supra note 84, ch. 5.
129. See Simons, supra note 119, at 820.
130. See ANDERSON, supra note 86.
2313June 20031
HeinOnline -- 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2313 2002-2003
Michigan Law Review
In modern states, law is itself a form of ritual and, to use anthro-
pologist Paul Bohannan's phrase, a set of "double-institutionalized"
norms. 131 Formal law will be most successful when its rituals are widely
acknowledged as meaningful and appropriate, and when the norms it
embodies are widely shared by its subjects. But whether or not law's
subjects regard it as legitimate, law always represents an effort (at
least on the part of those who create it) to organize and give moral
and social meaning to violence and suffering.
Again, however, law does not generally or necessarily operate to
reduce violence and suffering. Sometimes law is part of broader
cultural patterns that do tend to reduce violence and suffering. But
law can equally be part of broader cultural patterns tending to
increase violence and suffering. (And in either case, law cannot be
cleanly separated from other aspects of culture.) Law attaches labels
to certain kinds of violence and suffering. It labels violence and
suffering socially beneficial or socially detrimental, deliberate or acci-
dental, preventable or inevitable.'32 As such, in many modern societies
in which the law embodies widely shared norms, the law is an impor-
tant part of how people come to terms with suffering and violence.
D. Auto "Accidents" and Felony "Murders"
Law's role in giving meaning to violence can be illustrated by
reference to several examples from modern America, where most of
us accept the law's legitimacy (in other words, where most of us
believe in something we call "the rule of law"). First, consider some
familiar aspects of criminal law. On the most obvious level, law tends
to excuse "self-defense" and "accident," while it punishes "murder.' '1 33
Modem criminal law, as Austin Sarat and others have pointed out,
also defines most state-sponsored violence as good or appropriate
131. Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, in LAW AND WARFARE:
STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLICT, supra note 66, at 43,43.
132. 1 don't mean to imply, here, that labeling violence is law's sole or primary function.
After all, law is also concerned with the regulation of commercial affairs, family life, and
many other things. My argument is simply that to the extent law is concerned with violence,
it exists not to reduce it, but to categorize and give it meaning.
133. Much of the time, of course, litigants disagree about how to label a particular act of
violence or injury, and much skirmishing occurs over how to create a legal fact. This is im-
portant both because the tangible consequences of different legal labels differ ("murder" can
send someone to jail; "negligence" can lead to demands for compensation, etc.), but also
because the law helps construct the social meaning of events: it tells us how to "read"
violence and suffering. In a sense, "murder" and "accident" are empty categories, filled by
culture. For example, in some traditional Islamic cultures, killing to avenge certain kinds of
insult (such as adultery) are not construed as murder, while variants of respondeat superior
are invoked to turn what American legal culture would deem "accident" into crime. How
empty categories are filled tells us a great deal about a particular culture, but very little
about "law" per se.
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violence, while defining most private violence as bad."M Thus, the pain
and suffering caused by imprisonment or even the death penalty are
deemed acceptable, while the murderer's act fill most of us with
horror and are punished by the law.
Of course, it could be said that American criminal law assigns such
meanings to violence and suffering precisely in order to reduce
violence and suffering. But it is far from clear that modern American
criminal law in fact operates to reduce violence and suffering. This is a
hotly contested issue, but many have produced compelling evidence
(both theoretical and empirical) to suggest that our criminal law
spawns quite as much violence as it prevents - and that our law
defines out of existence certain categories of human suffering. Thus, it
is argued that the death penalty not only fails to deter violent crime,
but may indeed send a contrary message, one that indicates that life is
not terribly important after all, since the state itself may take it away
from its citizens.'35 Similarly, some note that many acts of private
violence are seen as "law affirming" by their perpetrators. 36
Moving away from criminal law, consider modern American tort
law. Guido Calabresi has argued that tort law can be understood as a
method of allocating the costs of accidents.37 Tort law thus represents
a set of implicit (and sometimes explicit) judgements about
cheapest-cost avoiders, but it also represents implicit judgements
about good and bad acts, avoidable suffering and unavoidable suffer-
ing, acceptable violence and unacceptable violence.'38 More than fifty
134. As Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns note, the law does this in part by rhetorically
effacing its own violence at the same time it rhetorically exaggerates private violence. See,
for example, Sarat and Kearns's rhetorical analysis of Francis v. Resweber. Sarat & Kearns,
supra note 98, at 213-18. See Robert Weisberg as well, noting that law wishes to assert that
force is categorically distinct from violence: "Violence is naturally imputed away to the other
- to the image of a separate criminal class distinct from normal humanity." Robert Weis-
berg, Private Violence as Moral Action: The Law as Inspiration and Example, in LAW'S
VIOLENCE 175,176 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
135. See generally GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 76-77 (1971) (not-
ing dryly the odd fact that "society has chosen to reduce the criminality of the offender by
forcing him to associate with more than a thousand other criminals for years on end"); THE
KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE (Austin Sarat
ed., 1999).
136. See Weisberg, supra note 134, at 196. Noting that the modern state has not, in prac-
tice, truly achieved a monopoly over violence as law enforcement. Weisberg suggests that
many "criminals" see themselves as sacrificing themselves for the greater good, pronouncing
sentence on those who have done wrong, or enforcing legitimate moral and legal norms
through their violent actions. Weisberg suggests that law may in fact "inspir[e] and em-
bolden[]" criminals through the ritual and theatrical aspects of punishment. Id. Gourevitch
and others note that in a different context, even genocide is seen as order affirming and
community creating by its perpetrators. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 123.
137. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
138. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIr, TRAGIC CHOICES
(1990).
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thousand Americans die every year in auto accidents, and hundreds of
thousands more are injured; thousands are permanently maimed.
These injuries and deaths occur as a result of collisions between
speeding hunks of metal, which, in turn, occur because American
society has decided that convenience and speed are worth more to us,
than saving lives.
As Calabresi reminds us, we know perfectly well that torn,
charred, and crushed flesh and bones will result from our desire for
speed and convenience, and in this sense the thousands of deaths
every year are knowingly inflicted by all Americans, collectively. Tort
law may assign one party to an accident the responsibility for paying
damages, and in extreme cases the criminal law may label one party
criminally liable. But for the most part, our law regards fifty thousand
mangled corpses as "inevitable" and "accidental," a regrettable but
acceptable by-product of the American desire for convenience.139
Contrast this with the many fewer deaths that occur as inadvertent
by-products of robberies motivated by drug addiction or economic
desperation, the deaths that occur when poor people who rob
convenience stores panic and end up killing the store clerk, and so on.
In some sense, such deaths are also "inevitable" and "accidental" in a
society characterized by great income inequality, yet our laws label the
resulting corpses anomalies that must not be permitted to exist. Thus,
in many states, felony murder (where a defendant was merely a
participant in a felony that led to a murder, although he did not
participate in the murder, and did not desire the murder) is punished
as severely as other murders.
My point here is not that automobiles should be forbidden and
felony murderers set free. On the whole, I benefit from and approve
of the social order that puts felony murderers in prison and allows the
rest of us to drive with abandon, even though the death and suffering
caused by our greedy desire for speed is far greater than the death and
suffering caused by the felony murderer's greedy desire for cash. My
point (as many others have noted before me) is that there is nothing
"natural" or inevitable about how we categorize things: auto "acci-
dents" and felony "murders" both represent choices about what
behavior we approve and what behavior we dislike.
E. Terrorism and Torture
I want to move a step beyond this basic argument, however, and
note its implications for how we think about violence and law. Auto
accidents and felony murders represent, specifically, a decision to
assign different kinds of moral meaning to different kinds of violence
139. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 138; CALABRESI & BOBBITr, supra note 138.
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and suffering. The many deaths from auto accidents are "no one's
fault," although driving carries a known and quantifiable risk of death.
The fewer deaths from felony murders are the "fault" of the hapless
accomplices to felonies. Thus, even in America, with its "rule of law"
culture, it is far from clear that the law reduces violence and suffering
in any abstract sense. Instead, the law assigns moral and social mean-
ing to violence and suffering. It is less interested in the sheer quantity
of violence and suffering than in labeling that violence and suffering so
as to render it more intelligible and meaningful. Humans may well de-
sire peace and prosperity, but often they desire meaning even more.
When we examine them closely, even those areas of law that we
consider most centrally concerned with reducing violence and
suffering reveal themselves as having different preoccupations. Take
an example from international human-rights law: human-rights law
insists that the prohibition on torture has the character of a peremp-
tory norm. Unlike certain other human rights, the prohibition on tor-
ture is nonderogable. According to the Torture Convention, "No ex-
ceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture."140
When it comes to torture, human-rights law has a Kantian abso-
luteness. There is no possible end that can justify torture as a means.
Thus, when faced with certain old chestnuts, human-rights law offers a
rigid response. If the police catch the terrorist who knows how to
defuse the hidden nuclear bomb that will shortly destroy New York
City, may the police torture the terrorist to find out the bomb's
location? The answer from human-rights law is a resounding no. From
the perspective of human-rights law, if the terrorist cannot be
convinced through reasoned argument to reveal the bomb's location,
then New York will just have to vanish in a nuclear holocaust."'
It would be difficult to claim, in this instance, that human-rights
law is primarily concerned with the reduction of violence and suffer-
ing.'42 From the viewpoint of the utilitarian, preventing ten million
140. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. 39th Sess., Annex, Supp.
No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984 (entered into force
June 26, 1987), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcat39.htm.
141. t was recently at a forum sponsored by the Kennedy School of Government where
several prominent American human-rights lawyers asserted precisely this. But compare
Alan Dershowitz's controversial op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, asserting that in such situa-
tions, torture might well be appropriate. Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to
Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at 19.
142. Cf. Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 425, 436 (1993) ("[T]here is no direct correlation between complying with international
legal rules and minimizing suffering .... The suffering permitted within the rules of interna-
tional law is stunning.") Kahn notes - critically - that when it comes to the laws of war,
"[lInternational law in its present form shows more concern with antiquated concepts of
chivalry among combatants than with the modern reality of mass destruction." Id. at 437.
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deaths is far more urgent than cosseting one terrorist. So what is
human-rights law trying to do? It is trying to make a statement about
the moral meaning of human action. It is not in fact terribly interested
in anyone's death or suffering.4 3 Mostly, it is concerned with how we
live our lives - and it is insistent that the act of torturing someone,
for whatever reason, so distorts human beings that it can never be
permitted. It is with voluntary evil that human-rights law concerns
itself.
F. Atrocity and Duress
Take a last example of the way law gives meaning to violence, this
one involving humanitarian law. In 1995, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia addressed the troubling case of
Drazen Erdemovic, a young Croatian soldier who joined the Bosnian,
Serb army in order to support his wife and small child.' 44 Sent to,
Srebenica in 1995, Erdemovic was ordered by his commanding officer
to participate in the massacre of thousands of unarmed Muslim civil-
ians. According to Erdemovic's own account, he at first refused to
participate, but was told that if he did not cooperate, he would be shot
himself. At this point, Erdemovic agreed to participate and joined in
the killing; by his own estimate, he may have killed as many as seventy
or eighty people.
Erdemovic later told his story to a journalist, and ultimately came
before the International Criminal Tribunal (more or less voluntarily),
where he pled guilty to committing crimes against humanity, but noted
that he had committed these crimes under extreme duress:
Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed
together with the victims. When I refused, they told me: "If you are sorry
for them, stand up, line up with them and we will kill you too."... I
could not refuse because they would have killed me.... I said immedi-
ately [to my commanding officer] that I did not want to take part in [the
This comes as no surprise, however, if we accept my premise that the law is not in fact con-
cerned with reducing suffering, but merely with articulating concepts of morality and honor.
143. It could be argued that this is just a short-term/long-term problem. In the short
term, torturing the terrorist may save New York, but in the long run, more people will suffer
if torture becomes a permissible police activity. I find this assertion unpersuasive, however,
since in this era of nuclear weapons it is entirely possible that a small number of terrorists
could literally wipe out life on earth. Given nuclear weapons, such "long-term" utilitarian
calculations lose their force.
144. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case IT-96-22-T (Sentencing Judgement) (U.N. Int'l
Crim. Trib. Yug. (Trial) 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/
judgement/erd-tsj961129e.pdf. For a lengthy discussion of this case and its implications, see,
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity and Duress, 43 VA. J. INT'L
L. 861, 863-69 (2003).
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massacre] and I said, "Are you normal? Do you know what you are
145doing?" But nobody listened to me ....
After some procedural confusion, the Appeals Chamber addressed
the question of whether Erdemovic's claim of duress should properly
have led him to plead not guilty - in other words, the Appeals
Chamber had to decide whether or not duress, if proven, constituted a
complete defense to charges of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. By a vote of three to two, the Appeals Chamber declared
that while duress might be a mitigating factor that would affect
sentencing, duress was not a complete defense. 46
This is, in some ways, an astonishing conclusion. Erdemovic had no
desire to kill innocent civilians, and he did so only when threatened
with his own imminent death. In the context, his death would have
served no consequentialist purpose; the Muslim civilians would have
been killed with or without Erdemovic's participation, and refusal to
participate in the massacre would merely have added Erdemovic to
the list of victims. In some sense, then, Erdemovic's acquiescence in
the massacre could be said to have reduced violence and suffering,
since at least it meant that his own corpse would not be added to the
pile at the end of the day. His refusal to participate would have injured
him and benefited no one, and his participation benefited him while
injuring no one who would not have been injured anyway. 147
Why then establish a legal standard that insists that duress was no
defense for Erdemovic? By establishing this standard, the majority on
the appeals court essentially declared that Erdemovic's legal guilt was
foreordained when he was ordered to Srebenica. The only way he
could have maintained his innocence would have been to allow
himself to be shot along with the civilian victims. As the Appeals
Chamber put it,
145. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case IT-96-22-A at 14 (sentencing Judgement) (U.N.
Int'l Crim. Trib. Yug. (App.) 1998) (quoting Erdemovic's testimony before the Trial Cham-
ber in 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgementerd-tsj9803
05e.pdf. Erdemovic ultimately received a five-year sentence.
146. Id. (Judgement) (U.N. Int'l Crim. Trib. Yug. (App.) 1997), available at http://
www.un.org/icty/ erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-aj971007e.pdf.
147. Judge Antonio Cassese takes this view. In his dissent in Erdemovic, Cassese argued
that had Erdemovic
compl[ied] with his legal duty not to shoot innocent persons, he would [have] forfeit[ed] his
life for no benefit to anyone and to no effect whatsoever apart from setting a heroic example
for mankind (which the law cannot demand him to set): his sacrifice of his own life would be
to no avail.
Id. at 44 (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, appended to Judgement),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-adojcas971007e.htm.
This, says Cassese, sets the standard unacceptably high: "Law is based on what society can
reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of behavior which
require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal behavior falling below
those standards." Id. at 47.
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[We reject] utilitarian logic.... The approach we take does not involve a
balancing of harms for and against killing .... [O]ur rejection of duress
as a defence to the killing of innocent human beings does not depend
upon what the reasonable person is expected to do. We would assert an
absolute moral postulate which is clear and unmistakable .... 148
In some sense, the Appeals Chamber was insisting that Erdemovic'
ought to have opted to die, rather than choosing life, if life meant
participating in terrible crimes.
Here too, it is hard to square such a decision with the idea that
humanitarian law is primarily concerned with reducing violence and
suffering. 49 Again, the law appears far more interested in attaching
moral meaning to violence, and making statements about how human
beings ought to relate to violence. In other words, the law is concerned
with establishing what it is to live a moral life - death is barely
relevant. Better by far, said the appellate court majority, to suffer and
die but be innocent than to taint one's life by committing crimes
against humanity.
Erdemovic himself seemed to agree with the majority: he wept as
he explained to the judges why he decided to plead guilty, despite the
fact that he acted under duress:
[My attorney] told me, "Drazen, can you change your mind, your deci-
sion? ... I do not know what will happen." I told him because of those
victims, because of my consciousness, because of my life, because of my
child and my wife, I cannot change what I said ... because of the peace
of my mind, my soul, my honesty, because of the victims and war and
because of everything.
Although I knew that my family, my parents, my brother, my sister,
would have problems because of that, I did not want to change it.
Because of everything that happened I feel terribly sorry, but I could not
do anything.... Thank you. I have nothing else to say. 150
Erdemovic's reaction, though perhaps belated (at least from the
view of the majority), points to something critically important and
often underestimated. Legal scholars - especially those of a law-and-
economics bent - often take it for granted that rational people es-
chew suffering and violence. But for many people, much of the time,
148. Id. at 1 80 & 83 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald & Vohrah,
appended to Judgement), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/
erd-asojmcd971007e.htm.
149. Indeed, some critics have argued that humanitarian law has historically operated to
expedite violence, not reduce it. See Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation
of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 50 (1994).
150. Erdemovic, Case IT-96-22-A at I 11 (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Stephen, appended to Judgement) (U.N. Int'l Crim. Trib. Yug. (App.) 1997) (quoting Er-
demovic's testimony at his November 1996 sentencing hearing), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-asojste971007e.pdf; see also id.
(Sentencing Judgment) (1998).
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living a "moral" life, or an honorable life, is more important than
finding guaranteed safety and prosperity. Drazen Erdemovic was
tormented by the memory of his own action, even though he felt that
he had had no choice; for Erdemovic, pleading guilty - and accepting
his sentence - was part of restoring his sense of himself as a moral
person. Since the only evidence against him came from his own
statements, he could certainly have avoided prosecution and punish-
ment had he wished to do so, and this would surely have been the
"rational" course of action. But for Erdemovic, suffering his sentence
was necessary to redemption.
Words like "redemption" are out of fashion in legal academia, but
the idea retains its power. Both committing and suffering acts of
violence can come to be heavily laden with moral meaning. Human-
rights law has tended to view violence and suffering as destructive of
moral meaning, and assumed that good people never desire violence
or suffering.'51 But this overlooks millennia of evidence that war and
killing are often the primary locus of moral meaning for many socie-
ties: to many, manliness, or courage, or tradition, or honor requires
acts of violence. Conversely, suffering and sacrifice have historically
been deeply attractive to many: consider the many potent stories of
political and religious martyrdom, or the events of September 11, or
the ongoing violence in the Middle East.'52
This is part of the reason that law correlates only weakly, if at all,
with the degree and distribution of social violence. Formal law, when
it exists, is primarily concerned with assigning moral meaning to vio-
lence and suffering, rather than with reducing it. Since some people
and some societies actually value high degrees of violence and
suffering, or value unequal distributions of violence and suffering, it
stands to reason that formal law in such societies may reflect these
preferences.
IV. TAKING NORMS SERIOUSLY
Where does this leave those who believe that violence is neither
desirable nor inevitable; that human beings can and do consciously
change the cultures in which they live; that much involuntary suffering
can therefore be alleviated; that both moral imperatives and sheer
151. See James R. Dawes, Language, Violence, and Human Rights Law, 11 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 215 (1999) (drawing on Scarry to assert that the prime dilemma for human rights is
that violence destroys all possibility of interpretation and meaning); cf ELAINE SCARRY,
THE BODY IN PAIN 127 (1985) (asserting that "war is a crisis of substantiation in which
shared meanings break down").
152. Cf Anthony T. Kronman, Amor Fati (The Love of Fate), 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 113
(1995) (arguing that humans love tragedy precisely because there is something about dissolu-
tion, chaos, suffering, and surrender that appeals to us by offering a glimpse of a different
sort of freedom and a different sort of meaning).
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self-interest give us reason to try to alleviate such suffering, and that
the complex mix of cultural commitments we call the rule of law does
in fact correlate with a less agonizing, more equitable, and less explo-
sive kind of social order?
I have argued so far that rule-of-law promotion efforts have been
disappointing in large part because they don't take enough account of
norms and culture. They tend to confuse formal law with substantive
normative commitments, assuming that the substantive values that
are at the core of most western concepts of the rule of law will flow
naturally from the creation of certain kinds of formal legal structures
(modernized statutes, courts, etc.). In practice, these rule-of-law
promotion efforts stumble when they come up against countervailing
cultural commitments that are resistant to clumsy and formalistic
efforts to change them. I have suggested that rule-of-law promotion
efforts face a chicken-and-egg problem: changes in formal law matter
where prevailing cultural norms say that formal law matters. But when
formal law has little resonance for people, changes in formal law
cannot by themselves create new normative commitments to the rule
of law.
Delving deeper, I have suggested that rule-of-law promotion
efforts are based on a false premise: that formal law produces order
and reduces violence and suffering, and that law is therefore the cure
for violence and disorder. I have argued that there is in fact little
correlation between law, order, and violence, and that law is merely
one mechanism that many modern cultures use to establish the moral
meaning of different kinds of violence and suffering. In many modern
societies, law is an important mechanism for establishing moral
meanihg, but it is not the only such mechanism. Thus, it is nafve to
imagine that changes to formal legal structures will have any necessary
impact on the degree and distribution of violence and suffering in a
given society. In some societies that lack a shared normative
commitment to the rule of law, only nonlegal initiatives are likely to
have any immediate effect on the degree and distribution of violence
- and they will be effective only if they succeed in offering alternative
narratives that assign new cultural meaning to violence and suffering.
Although law, order, and violence are not always causally linked,.
certain societies are clearly more equitable and less violent than.
others.153 Societies organize and understand violence and suffering in
many different ways, and while "law" plays no inherent role in reduc-
ing violence and suffering, certain cultures give law an important role
in regulating violence and suffering. When societies decide that law is
153. Although generalizations are dangerous and degrees of equity and violence nearly
impossible to measure in a satisfying way, I think few would disagree that Sweden is more
equitable and less violent than Pakistan, for instance, or that Canada is more equitable and
less violent than Nigeria.
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a good mechanism to regulate and assign meaning to violence, changes
in formal law can indeed lead to changes in the amount and nature of
violence. Law reflects social norms, but in societies that believe in the
rule of law, law can also shape norms, albeit in ways that are often
complex and less predictable than we might wish.154
A. Three Clusters of Questions
If we consider interventions to promote human rights and the rule
of law to be justifiable and important at times, whether for moral
reasons, economic reasons, or security reasons, we are then faced with
some very fundamental questions indeed, questions to which legal
scholars have as yet paid insufficient attention: What precisely are the
cultural conditions in which law matters? What are the circumstances
in which legal rules become enforceable and accepted as legitimate?
Under what conditions can law play a role in shaping cultural
understandings of violence? When and how can "outsiders" help
create those conditions in a given society?
Most fundamentally, these are all issues of norm creation. And al-
though social norms are tightly linked to law in some societies, they
are not at all linked in others. When they are delinked, changing the
law will have little effect; only an explicit focus on norm creation is
likely to lead to the possibility of the rule of law.
Of course, it is easy to state this, and less easy to know what to do
about it. Let me begin by laying out a research agenda involving three
clusters of questions. None of the questions are easy to answer, but if
we do not begin to grapple with them, international interventions
designed to promote human rights and the rule of law will continue to
have disappointing results.
1. Choosing and Justifying Norms
First, what norms should we be trying to create, and how can we
justify them? In other words, what precisely are the norms that
underlie a substantive commitment to the rule of law, and that can
thus enable formal law to be an effective mechanism for further
154. Empirically, there is at least some reason to believe that societies with strong
normative commitments to the bundle of values and institutions we call the rule of law are
more equitable and less violent than many other societies in the world today. My claim here
is not that modern, technocratic, liberal-democratic societies are the only "good" way to or-
ganize human beings into units - merely that if we believe that less violence is better than
more violence, and that various kinds of suffering should be as evenly distributed as possible,
liberal democracies certainly appear today to be accomplishing these goals rather better than
other modem forms of social organization. If this is indeed the case, then interventions and
aid programs designed to promote the rule of law are both justifiable and important. For a
detailed discussion of the value of democratic governance and the rule of law in reducing
both inter- and intrastate violence, see generally Moore, supra note 48.
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cultural change and adaptation? What norms are conducive to less
violent and more equitable societies? And how do we justify trying to
"interfere" in other societies to create these norms?
2. Effective Norm Change
Second, how can these norms be created effectively in societies
where they are not widespread to begin with? Can we make any
cross-cultural generalizations? At what stage is norm creation better
accomplished through education, the media, civil society, and means
other than "law"? When does focusing on political elites pay off, and
when do bottom-up methods work best?
3. Constraints
Third, does a commitment to the norms underlying a substantive
conception of the rule of law place limits on the methods the U.S. and
the international community should use to create new norms in transi-
tional societies?155 In other words, does the answer to question one
place ethical or legal limits on the ways we can answer question two?
Of the three clusters of questions I have laid out, I consider ques-
tion two most compelling. I.want to bracket the first question, since I
see it as primarily a question for the philosophers among us. If we are
not careful we can go around in circles with it for quite a while. After
all, in a sense it is akin to the relativism/universalism debate that has
plagued human rights for a long time.'56 In The Law of Peoples, John
Rawls recently weighed in on this broad debate, suggesting that there
certaiqly are some core values that a liberal state may require other
states to respect if it is to recognize their sovereignty - including the
obligation to honor human rights.' Martha Nussbaum has suggested
that we move beyond the discourse of human rights to a universalism
based on the idea of essential human capabilities. 58 Various other
scholars have focused on the somewhat narrower question of the
normative commitments underlying the rule of law and suggested
155. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996).
156. For two recent takes on this debate, see Robert Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism:
A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 527 (2001), and Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1181 (2001).
157. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
158. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000) (drawing
on AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999)).
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reasons to consider the rule of law a value system worthy of export-
ing. 15
9
All of these approaches are compelling, in their different ways. I
am fully persuaded that there are certain core values, capacities, or
rights (I am agnostic about which description is best) that are univer-
sal. These values act as imperatives, justifying both individual action
when they are denied and, at times, concerted action by governments
and intergovernmental groups, even when such concerted action
involves violating state sovereignty, and even when it goes against the
wishes of a majority of people affected by the intervention. These are
fighting words. I think they can be defended, but that is not my
primary concern here - I know that others have already taken these
questions on and will continue to do so. So I will leave these questions
to one side for the time being.
The second question I raised is particularly urgent. Once we decide
what norms we are trying to create and how interventions to create
them can be justified - once we have recognized that formal law will
only make a difference when we have certain widely shared normative
commitments - how do we figure out how to create those normative
commitments?
I find this question most compelling because it is both critical and
understudied, especially in the international context. It is critical espe-
cially in the wake of September 11, as the U.S. struggles to confront
widespread global resentment and the occasional acts of terrorism that
such resentment inspires. But while a good deal of recent work on
domestic legal issues takes on the descriptive project of analyzing how
norms and law interact,1"' only a few legal scholars have addressed the
question of how purposive governmental or nongovernhiental
norm-creation projects might actually work.'61 This lacuna is even
more noticeable in the domain of international and comparative law. 62
159. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (2d ed. 1992) (arguing that military interventions that
violate a state's sovereignty are generally to be discouraged, and may be justified only in ex-
treme situations (i.e., to remedy cases of enslavement, massacres, large scale human-rights
violations, etc.)); see also Kairys, supra note 40; Teitel, supra note 40.
160. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 84; ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338 (1997).
161. Some exceptions here are Cass Sunstein, Dan Kahan, and Larry Lessig, among
others, who have done interesting preliminary work on self-conscious norm-change efforts.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement
in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and So-
cial Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 155. For a completely dif-
ferent approach, see JACK BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY
(1998), urging an epidemiological model for understanding cultural change.
162. Some recent work has focused on norms and perceptions of legitimacy in interna-
tional law. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 52; see also Purvis, supra note 52, at 112 (noting in
passing that "[s]tructuralism in anthropology seems particularly relevant to the problem of
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As I noted towards the beginning of this Article, these issues of norm
creation in the complex context of modem, international interventions
are located at the interstices of international law, comparative law,
and domestic law, traditionally conceived. They have found no disci-
plinary home, and tend to slip through the cracks, always at the
periphery, never at the center of attention.
Answering these questions about how to promote norm change
involves taking stock of what we, as lawyers and legal scholars, know
about how cultures change and about how individuals and groups
come to alter their normative commitments. Unfortunately, we do not
know very much. Most of the time, it doesn't even occur to us to ask
the right questions.
But although lawyers and legal scholars may not know much about
how cultures change, there are others who know at least a good bit
more.1"3 Some anthropologists, for instance, study the question of how
cultures change - and how and when law changes and is changed
by norms."6 There is also an emerging literature coming out of busi-
ness schools and sociology departments about how cultures change -
work that is often pitched in the context of how corporate organiza-
tional cultures can be changed,"5 but that may nonetheless hold
important implications for those of us interested in Kosovo or Russia,
or America's troubled inner cities, for that matter. Hollywood
marketing experts and advertising-agency executives also may know a
surprising amount about norm creation. After all, they appear to be
rather good at convincing people around the world to watch certain
films, listen to certain music, and desire certain clothes and cars.
The "bad guys" - the "conflict entrepreneurs" - also know quite
a lot about norm creation. Human-rights advocates and scholars who
study norms are fond of using the term "norm entrepreneurs" '66 to
explaining international law's authority"). For the most part, this work has focused on gov-
ernmental elites and state-to-state behavior, rather than on the behavior of states toward
their citizens or the behavior of citizens and groups to one another within the boundaries of
a state or society. Since this is the primary subject of international human-rights law, this la-
cuna is particularly problematic.
163. See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 2 (calling for increasing attention both to issues of law
as culture and to insights from other scholarly disciplines).
164. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 131; see also PAUL BOHANNAN, How CULTURE
WORKS (1995); DONALD L. DONHAM, WORK AND POWER IN MAALE, ETHIOPIA (2d ed.
1994); SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND FABRICATIONS (1986); PARKER SHIPTON,
B ITER MONEY (1989); Donald L. Donham, Revolution and Modernity in Maale: Ethiopia,
1974-1987, 34 CoMP. STUD. IN SOC'Y & HIST. 28 (1992); Sally Falk Moore, The Ethnography
of the Present and the Analysis of Process, in ASSESSING CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 362
(Robert Borofsky ed., 1994); Simons, supra note 119.
165. See, e.g., MICHAEL FULLAN, LEADING IN A CULTURE OF CHANGE (2001); EDGAR
H. SCHEIN, THE CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL GUIDE (1999).
166. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st
Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 303 (2002); see also Sunstein, supra note 155, at 909.
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describe people such as Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Mother Teresa.
The term is not ill-used; all of these people managed to persuade quite
a lot of other people to alter some of their most deeply held beliefs.
But if Mandela is a norm entrepreneur, so is Osama bin Laden, and so
are the planners of Palestinian suicide bombings. So was Slobodan
Milosevic, and so were the Hutu leaders whose names are unfamiliar
to most of us, but who succeeded in dramatically shifting the norma-
tive commitments of several million Rwandan Hutus. Osama bin
Laden convinced the September 11 hijackers and a large network of
other supporters that America's evils justified killing several thousand
civilians - and that striking against America was worth certain
death. 67 Palestinian suicide bombers (or Tamil suicide bombers, for
that matter) must similarly believe their cause so exalted as to be
worth both killing and dying for. And Milosevic and the Rwandan
genocidaires succeeded in convincing an awful lot of ordinary people
that their next-door neighbors - the very people from whom they had
been borrowing sugar and for whom they had been babysitting -
were fundamental ethnic threats, sub-humans who had to be elimi-
nated or "cleansed" before they could do untold damage to the
community of Serbs or Hutus. Hitler, too, was a norm entrepreneur, a
chillingly successful one. (And it is worth noting that Milosevic, Hitler,
and the Rwandan genocidaires all made ample use (or misuse) of
"law" to advance their genocidal agendas.)
Those who care about human rights and the rule of law cannot
afford to leave all of the creative insights about norm creation to the
anthropologists or to Hollywood - and we certainly cannot afford to
leave them to the bad guys. 68 Yet so far, that is precisely what most of
us have done, and this has to change.
Let me touch briefly on the third question I mentioned: whether a
commitment to the norms underlying a substantive conception of the
rule of law places limits on the methods the U.S. and international
community should use to create new norms in transitional societies.
The answer is certainly yes: bin Laden and Milosevic and the
Rwandan genocidaires may have been such effective norm entrepre-
neurs precisely because they were unconstrained, which is to say that
they were able to use murder and terror and lies to alter norms.
Murder and terror and lies may well be effective ways to alter norms,
but are these methods that the international community should use in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or East Timor?
167. See, e.g., Ehrenreich & Brooks, supra note 118.
168. Cf BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 40, 42 (1992)
("Liberals cannot afford to wait on the sidelines while nationalists indulge in populist dema-
gogy.... If liberals allow nationalists a monopoly on the effort at mass mobilization, they
will be digging their own grave.").
2327June 20031
HeinOnline -- 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2327 2002-2003
Michigan Law Review
Indeed, the constraints on what we do in places such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, Kosovo, or East Timor may arise not only out of our
basic normative commitments, but also out of the very fact that we can
engage in the project of norm creation in these places precisely
because we have superior powers of coercion. The U.S. now runs Iraq
through force majeure, and although interventions elsewhere have
enjoyed more multilateral support, the UN similarly runs places like
Kosovo and Afghanistan by dint of thousands of heavily armed
soldiers (and by the threat of even more soldiers and airplanes and
bombs). Precisely because the balance of force is so much in our favor,
our methods of norm creation must be constrained. In Afghanistan
and Iraq in particular, U.S. claims to represent and advance the rule of
law will inevitably be contrasted with our often ham-handed use of
coercion. This contrast will be noted by ordinary citizens, who may
view the notion of the rule of law skeptically when it appears to come
only from the barrel of a gun. And the contrast will be exploited by
supporters of ousted regimes and international terrorist groups.69
How we answer question one - what norms are we trying to
create, and how do we justify them - inevitably affects how we an-
swer this last question about the constraints on our norm-creation
methods. I want to note here that the question of whether a commit-
ment to human rights requires a commitment to democracy and self-
determination is of particular importance to the question of how our
norm-creation efforts should be constrained. If we believe that a
commitment to human rights and the rule of law requires a simultane-
ous and evenly balanced commitment to democracy, the possible
norm-creation methods open to us may be fewer in number than the
techniques available if we decide that democracy is in fact a legiti-
mately lower priority than human rights.t70
But I want to bracket this question as well - as similarly best
suited to the philosophers - and return to the second cluster of ques-
tions: How do you change norms effectively? How do you create the
conditions in which law matters? These questions are far larger than
this Article, and there will never be any definitive answers to such
complex questions. Nonetheless, I want to do two things in the
remainder of this Article: first, offer some suggestions of fruitful ways
to feeling our way toward some answers; and second, offer some
preliminary hypotheses about the kinds of lessons that might emerge if
scholars take up this research agenda.
169. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, By Force of Will, LEGAL AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 24
(discussing this issue in the context of Iraq); cf Sunstein, supra note 155 (asking a similar
question in the context of liberal-government norm creation in the domestic sphere).
170. See RAWLS, supra note 157; cf ACKERMAN, supra note 168, at 69 (suggesting that
there may be a tradeoff between accountability and constitution making).
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B. Research Methods
A serious effort to develop answers involves moving beyond the
terrain in which lawyers are most comfortable to engage with the
literature of other disciplines: the literatures on corporate organiza-
tional change, on advertising methodologies, and on political socializa-
tion, as well as literature from the more traditional academic disci-
plines of anthropology, history, psychology, and sociology.171 But even
more importantly, feeling our way towards some answers will involve
serious empirical work, and the development of comparative case
studies. We will have to identify instances of rapid and wide-scale
norm transformation - for better or for worse - in various societies,
and try to analyze the factors that contributed to that rapid norm
transformation. It will also be useful to compare unsuccessful attempts
to shift norms, and identify frequently made mistakes. Obviously,
every society is unique, heterogeneous, and subject to differing exter-
nal pressures and differing internal contestations. As such, comparing
successful and failed norm-transformation efforts in different societies
will hardly be a scientific endeavor. Nonetheless, I believe that the
exercise is one from which we can learn.
As a start, for instance, it will be useful to look closely at both
negative and positive instances of rapid norm transformation, some
well in the past, some more recent. We might look closely at the
period in Germany leading up to the rise of Hitler and World War II,
in which moderate and episodic anti-Semitism and xenophobia was
transformed into a willingness to participate in the extermination of
Jews and other groups for some, and a willingness to simply look away
for others.'72 But it will be equally useful to look at West Germany
after World War II came to an end, under the Allied occupation,
a period that for all its problematic aspects led to rapid and apparently
deep transformations of German political culture, as Germans
redefined their national self-conception, becoming a society that
prides itself on political pluralism and pacifism. Looking closely at pre-
and post-World War II Japan may be equally instructive.'73 There too,
171. I am thinking in particular of works such as BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 1991), and THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm &
Terence Ranger eds., 1992).
172. For better or for worse, the literature on this is already vast. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND
THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (1992); INGA CLENDINNEN, READING THE HOLOCAUST
(1999); GOLDHAGEN, supra note 104. It goes without saying that I reject the notion of the
Holocaust as somehow ineffable and unrepresentable. If we are to understand how to pre-
vent future genocides, we must struggle to comprehend and represent the Holocaust, or risk
having it repeat itself over and over - as it already has, in many ways, in Rwanda, and al-
most did in Yugoslavia.
173. See generally JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF
WORLD WAR 11 (1999) (providing a fascinating account of occupied Japan).
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rapid norm transformations both preceded and followed the war, and
both periods involved conscious efforts on the part of the authorities
to shift norms.'74
Closer to the present, looking at Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia will be useful, both before and after their collapse into
genocide and near-genocide. What caused the rapid norm transforma-
tion in Rwanda that led thousands of ordinary Hutus - people who
had lived side by side with Tutsis for generations, worked with them,
and frequently intermarried with them - to willingly hack their Tutsi
neighbors to death with machetes? 75 How are Rwandans today
learning to live together again? What, if anything, was the role of law
in the period leading up to the genocide? And what is the role of law
today in rebuilding a multiethnic Rwandan society? The same ques-
tions can be asked of Yugoslavia: how did an obscure politician called
Slobodan Milosevic turn his dream of a greater Serbia into the
animating force for the most brutal ethnic cleansing Europe had seen
since the Holocaust? 76 How and why are efforts to move beyond the
politics of ethnic hatred succeeding or failing today in Slovenia,
Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo? And, of course, we
can ask these questions about the rise of extremist Islam in some
corners of the globe: How have so many young Palestinians been
persuaded that suicide bombings are worthwhile? Why was the
Taliban appealing to so many Afghans? How has Osama bin Laden so
successfully recruited so many would-be terrorists?
We also need to look at the genocides and wars that did not
happen. These are harder to identify, since they are the dogs that did
not bark in the night, but South Africa and Czechoslovakia both come
to mind. Both are places in which racial or ethnic hatreds might have
turned into civil war, but did not. In both places politicians struggled
hard to create cultures of toleration and pluralism. South Africa in
174. For an interesting preliminary analysis of these issues, see RAY SALVATORE
JENNINGS, THE ROAD AHEAD: LESSONS IN NATION BUILDING FROM JAPAN, GERMANY,
AND AFGHANISTAN FOR POSTWAR IRAQ (U.S. Institute for Peace, Peaceworks Report No.
49, 2003). The Allied occupations of Germany and Japan of course involved a high degree of
coercion. The Allies had won the war. As a result, these examples implicate the third cluster
of questions I raised earlier: Are there methods of norm creation that a human-rights-
minded government (or NGO, or individual, or intergovernmental body) ought not to use?
Does the presence of coercion change the sphere of permissible methods?
175. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 123, at 17:
[M]ass violence, too, must be organized .... Even mobs and riots have a design .... It must
be conceived as the means toward achieving a new order, and although the idea behind that
new order may be criminal and objectively very stupid, it must also be compellingly simple
and at the same time absolute.
176. See JUDAH, supra note 68. It's worth recalling that Milosevic's Bosnian Serb
partner, fellow indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, was a psychiatrist by profession.
Profile, Radovan Karadzic (BBC News, Jan. 17, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/
europe/876084.stm.
2330 [Vol. 101:2275
HeinOnline -- 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2330 2002-2003
The New Imperialism
particular may hold useful lessons: despite its continuing difficulties, it
is a success story in which conscious and creative government spon-
sored norm-creation efforts have played an important part.
Implicit in all I have said so far is the assumption that history is
something made. It does not just happen. Genocides require conscious
design'77 - and so does nation building, as does the creation of the
rule of law.'78 Human society is far too complex for us to be able to
understand these processes in any scientific way. (As Marx famously
said, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as
they please .... ,)179 Nonetheless, I am convinced that we will be able
to draw some cross-culturally useful answers from deliberative,
comparative work."8
Here, too, the project of developing useful case studies will take
time. Nonetheless, let me offer a few brief anecdotes and vignettes to
illustrate some of the reasons I believe this comparative work will pay
off - followed by some tentative general hypotheses.
Consider four brief examples from four very different societies:
1. In the former Yugoslavia, during the years preceding dissolu-
tion and war, the images of different ethnic groups in the
state-mandated primary-school textbooks changed steadily. Over
time, the images of non-Serbians grew steadily more bellicose and
negative, as the stories of Serbian history came more and more to
emphasize both a history of Serbian victimhood and the Serbian
"tradition" of "incomprehensible and amazing heroism, obediently
laying down one's life for the fatherland."'' Serbian "turbo-folk"
music sent the same message, insisting that the time for glorious
vengeance was near.18
2
177. Cf GOUREVITCH, supra note 123, at 95 (noting that "[glenocide ... is an exercise
in community building," one that arises out of order and belief in authority rather than out
of chaos and anarchy). Gourevitch chillingly lays out the sequence of events leading up to
the Rwandan genocide.
178. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 171; MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND
BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993); THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION, supra note 171.
179. Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 320 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., Anchor
Books 1959) (1869).
180. In the arcane but critical field of "genocide studies," some important work has al-
ready been done, comparing early warning signs of genocide in different societies and sug-
gesting some "lessons learned" for genocide prevention. See generally the work of the
Center for the Prevention of Genocide, www.genocideprevention.org.
181. Franke Wilmer, Identity, Culture, and Historicity: The Social Construction of Eth-
nicity in the Balkans, 160 WORLD AFF. 1, 9 (1997) (quoting VESNA PESIC & RUZICA
ROSANDIC, WARFARE, PATRIOTISM AND PATRIARCHY: AN ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS 65 (Center for Antiwar Action, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1994)).
182. See Wilmer, supra note 181, at 9; see also FRANKE WILMER, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: IDENTITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE IN
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2002).
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2. In Rwanda, the years leading up to the genocide saw a signifi-
cant rise in government-sponsored hate radio and hate newspapers
(such as Kangura and Radio-T616vision Libre des Mille Collines).
Frequently, the media depicted Tutsis as nonhuman, often as "iny-
enzi": cockroaches - who naturally required extermination.'83 In 1990
the "Hutu Ten Commandments" were broadcast on radio stations
throughout Rwanda; the commandments included "Hutus must stop
having mercy on the Tutsis."' One popular song of the era leading up
to the genocide went, "Where are those Tutsi who used to phone me?
Ah, they must have all been exterminated. Let us sing: The Tutsi have
been killed. God is always just! The criminals will be exterminated!"185
The phenomenon of hate media in pregenocide Rwanda was identical
in many respects to the caricaturing of Jews as nonhuman simians and
rodents that was typical of pro-Hitler media in post-World War I
Germany and Austria.'86
3. In postwar Japan, MacArthur's efforts to create a democratic
Japan relied on indirect rule, making extensive use of existing
Japanese law and institutions. ' To the extent MacArthur and the
Allies eliminated and reformed some laws and institutions, they built
heavily and consciously on existing traditions and tropes as they did so
- including the near-divine status of the Emperor, whom the allies
exonerated from blame for the war and Japanese atrocities, despite his
clear complicity. The Allies relied heavily on censorship and control of
the media to send democratic messages."
4. In South Africa, the postapartheid ANC government sought
to alter South Africa's political culture through a participatory
constitutional-revision process in which ordinary South Africans were
encouraged to participate.'89 The government sponsored constitutional
idea hotlines, placed cartoons in regional newspapers encouraging
183. See A. WALTER DORN ET AL., PREVENTING THE BLOODBATH: COULD THE U.N.
HAVE PREDICTED AND PREVENTED THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE? (Cornell Univ. Peace
Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 24, Nov. 1999), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/
wps/doa0l/.
184. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 123; see also Dina Temple-Raston, Journalism and
Genocide, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 18.
185. See DORN ET AL., supra note 183.
186. For a discussion of patterns leading up to genocides, see generally PREVENTIVE
MEASURES: BUILDING RISK ASSESSMENT AND CRISIS EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS (John L.
Davies & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 1998); Temple-Raston, supra note 184; Ervin Staub, The
Evolution and Prevention of Genocide and Mass Killing, with Some Thoughts on Kosovo,
OTHER VOICES, Feb. 2000, at www.othervoices.org/2.1/staub/commentary.html.
187. See generally DOWER, supra note 173.
188. See id.
189. 1 lived in South Africa from August to November 1995, researching efforts to cre-
ate a human-rights culture in the South African police; these observations are based on per-
sonal experience.
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people to mail in their thoughts on how the new South African state
should define itself, sponsored school debates and television shows,
and plastered posters all over South Africa. People were urged to send
in or call in their ideas on everything ranging from which rights should
be enshrined in the Constitution to what the new state flag and songs
should be. The government also used traditional African concepts
such as "ubuntu" (meaning, loosely, harmony and mutual respect) to
advance a conception of the new, tolerant, multiracial society that
would peacefully replace the old, divided society of the apartheid era.
In many ways, the government took a Wizard-of-Oz-type approach to
using the formal law to create a culture of the rule of law: believe in
the Wizard, don't look behind the curtain, and the Wizard is real; act
as if law matters, and it will. In South Africa, there is some evidence
that this collective, government-encouraged leap of faith created
something real."
C. Preliminary Hypotheses
What lessons might we learn from these anecdotes and the
comparative case studies yet to be developed? Right now, only the
most tentative hypotheses can be advanced, which will have to be
tested against more extensive theoretical and comparative work.
Nonetheless, let me offer some thoughts, based on what has already
been discussed in this Article and on my own additional preliminary
field and library research, about how we might make rule-of-law
promotion efforts more sophisticated and nuanced - and thus more
successful. Although it may be too late for these lessons in many rule-
of-law promotion efforts, it is not yet too late in Afghanistan and Iraq
(although the early signs are that few lessons have been learned).
At this preliminary stage, we might consider seven proposals for
more effective rule-of-law promotion. They all overlap, but are con-
ceptually distinct, and they can be abbreviated as follows: A) Know
what you want; B) Know the culture; C) Build on what's there; D)
Acknowledge the lure of violence and sacrifice and offer alternative
narratives to provide moral meaning; E) Don't assume law's central-
ity; F) Make-believe may sometimes work; and G) Pick your battles.
The proposals that follow are advanced with some trepidation.
They are not a panacea; promoting the rule of law is something that
will always be complex and difficult, because so many factors need to
be reckoned with. Nonetheless, I offer these proposals as a prelimi-
nary step forward.
A) Know what you want. First, for norm-creation efforts to be
successful, their architects need to know precisely what it is that they
190. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Creating a Human Rights Culture: The Case of the
South African Police (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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are trying to do. This is difficult, especially when it is the international,
community, so-called, that is intervening in an effort to create new
norms: that is, when it is the UN, or NATO, or some other regional or
multinational entity. Such entities are notoriously hampered by the
diversity of constituencies within them. Nonetheless, even UNMIK in
Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor have broad discretion in a day-
to-day sense, and the lack of effort to clarify the goals and internal
contradictions of rule-of-law promotion efforts certainly played a role
in the disappointing results. And to a significant extent, the govern-
mental and intergovernmental bureaucrats involved in these interven-
tions (and the NGO actors as well) fall back on previously existing
understandings and consensus about goals - which means that more
theoretical discussion of goals, abstracted from a given conflict or
transition, may help ensure that interventions can get off the ground
quickly and effectively.
An obvious corollary to knowing what you want is to be consistent.
If norm-creation architects alter their message and their methods all
the time, it is unlikely that they will be effective - and, as the Kosovo
examples indicate, when the norms they wish to create are those asso-
ciated with "the rule of law," lack of consistency can be fatal.
B) Know the culture at issue and take it seriously. On some level,
there is no such things as "Kosovar culture" or "Sierra Leonean
culture" or "Iraqi culture" or "Afghan culture"; there are only indi-
viduals and groups who are at any given time struggling, arguing,
questioning one another, and creating new narratives and structures.
But postmodern insights notwithstanding, it remains possible to make
certain kinds of cultural generalizations: for instance, that the concept
of honor is more important in Kosovo than it is in America, or that the
concept of "dignity" is more important in the legal cultures of France
and Germany than it is in America,' or that consensual methods of
resolving disputes and rituals of atonement and compensation are
more valued in Sierra Leone than in America. Despite our modern
temptation to assume that in this era of globalization and the Internet,
everyone is really the same all over the world, people are not the
same. All humans have the same inherent capacities, but culture and
experience form the lenses through which we see the world. With
imagination and effort, most of us can learn to see through different
eyes, to some extent at least - but our differences in perspective,
though not immutable, are real, and we ignore them at our peril.
It should go without saying that in order to change the norms of a
given culture, one must first understand what existing norms are and
how they came to be. Unfortunately, many of today's neo-imperialists
are as ignorant of the cultures they seek to change as most
191. See generally James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies,
109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000).
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nineteenth-century European imperial bureaucrats were of the
colonial societies over which they ruled.192 But it matters that the idea
of honor is important in Kosovo: if we know that, we can predict that
certain actions (such as UNMIK Regulation 1) will have negative
effects, and we may also be able to work with local people who share
our goals to capitalize on existing traditions. There might be creative
ways, for instance, to use even old traditions of honor and bloodfeud
to underscore the importance of mercy, fairness, atonement, and
compensation, aspects of bloodfeud that have always existed and have
historically been used to mitigate bloodfeud's potentially devastating
impact. 93
C) Build on what's there. Another lesson, then, is that norm entre-
preneurs (be they governments or NGO activists) should build on
existing cultural materials. The fact that Kosovars (and Serbs as well)
come from a society in which elaborate bloodfeud traditions were
widespread and persistent until relatively recently 94 may help account
for the rapidity with which the former Yugoslavia slid into violence -
but perhaps the bloodfeud tradition (the Code of Lek in Albania) did
not have to lead in the direction of unending violence and atrocity. As
Kosovar legal scholar Blerim Reka has argued in the Kosova Law
Review and elsewhere, the honor-based Code of Lek also contains
guidelines about how to bring cycles of revenge to a peaceful end. It
involves rituals of forgiveness and mercy quite as much as it outlines
rituals of violence and death.' While the Code has no formal status, it
remains an important referent, and source of moral authority for many
Kosovars (especially rural people). Milosevic and Hashim Thaqi's
KLA fighters chose to draw upon the latter aspects of the bloodfeud
tradition; creative promoters of the rule of law might be able to bene-
fit from drawing consciously upon the former.
Similarly, in South Africa, government and nongovernmental
norm entrepreneurs used the Nguni term "ubuntu" to appeal to tradi-
tional African notions of intergroup cooperation. Ubuntu is an
umbrella term that includes concepts such as sharing, harmony,
cooperation, and mutual respect. The ideas of ubuntu are reflected in
the saying "Umntu Ngumntu Ngabantu": "A person is a person
through other people." This notion was used to try to bring an end to
intergroup violence, and to help create a feeling of unity after the divi-
siveness of apartheid. Norm entrepreneurs sought deliberately to
192. Over and over, on my travels, I have been amazed by the number of well-meaning
"experts" on promoting human rights and the rule of law who lacked even the most rudi-
mentary knowledge of the history and traditions of the societies they wished to change.
Current U.S. efforts in Iraq are also a case in point.
193. See Hasluck, supra note 66, at 385, 406; see also REKA, supra note 66.
194. See REKA, supra note 66; see also Hasluck, supra note 66.
195. See REKA, supra note 66.
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replace older myths about conflict and difference (the story of the
Battle of Blood River, the story of the Voortrekkers, etc.) 19 6 with new
stories based on equally potent cultural materials. Although South
Africa faces many problems, it did not collapse into violence and civil
war, and the creativity of government norm-creation methods may be
partly the reason for its relative success.
19 7
In Rwanda, government efforts to try thousands upon thousands of
people for genocide quickly overwhelmed the court system, led to
massive human-rights violations as suspects were detained for long
periods in inadequate prisons, and culminated in popular frustration
that there was no true accountability for the foot soldiers of the geno-
cide. In 1998-1999, the Rwanda government released many lower-level
suspects, and passed a bill permitting local communities to use tradi-
tional "gacaca" dispute-mechanism proceedings to address such
accused genocidaires. Gacaca traditionally has involved entire com-
munities in deliberating on the appropriate response to crime and con-
flict, and the tradition has emphasized reconciliation and atonement as
well as punishment. It is too early to say how the gacaca system will
do, but it may hold out Rwanda's best hope of coming to terms with
the genocide in a way that rebuilds public confidence in the govern-
ment and the rule of law.' 98 Similarly, in Sierra Leone, creating the
rule of law in the aftermath of one of the world's most brutal civil wars
may depend on the government's ability to link legalistic methods
of seeking accountability (through the UN-created Special Court)
with a broader truth-and-reconciliation program, one that seeks to
reintegrate violent individuals into the community by building upon
the cleansing and atonement rituals used for centuries in tribal "secret
societies" such as the Poro, Wende, Gbangbani, and Bondo.
Would-be norm entrepreneurs need to take seriously myths and
stories, customs and rituals, habits and assumptions, and patterns of
interaction. All of these may be misused and manipulated to sow
discord and violence - but they are available to the positive-norm
entrepreneur as well. And just as a society's traditions and myths may
themselves provide building blocks for the norm entrepreneur, the
successful norm entrepreneur will also make use, insofar as possible,
of existing institutions, from the media to schools, churches, and pro-
fessional associations. The media in particular can play a critical role:
in Rwanda and predissolution Yugoslavia, hate media helped enable
the slide into genocide; more recently, television probably played a
196. See CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, What Can Become of South Africa?, in PASSION AND
CUNNING: ESSAYS ON NATIONALISM, TERRORISM, AND REVOLUTION 142-43 (1988).
197. Much of this is based on my own 1995 research in South Africa.
198. See generally JOHN PRENDERGAST & DAVID SMOCK, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE,
POST-GENOCIDAL RECONSTRUCTION: BUILDING PEACE IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI
(1999), available at http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990915/sr990915.html.
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crucial role in the peaceful end of Milosevic's rule'99 and in the top-
pling of General Guei in C6te D'Ivoire z.2 1 Attempts to prevent geno-
cides and build the rule of law will have to consciously counter the
effects of hate media.
Building on existing institutions may be more effective than creat-
ing "brand new" institutions, as long as the institutions that are built
upon are credible.201 While there may be times when some sort of
institutional or culture "shock therapy" genuinely works (the archi-
tects of Russian economic reform imagined that this was what they
were doing),2 °z most people may be far more willing to accept change
if new things can be linked imaginatively to existing traditions and
institutions that seem authentic.
D) Acknowledge the lure of violence and suffering, and seek
alternative ways to provide moral meaning. To some people, some of
the time, violence and suffering are deeply compelling in ways that go
far beyond "material" advantage. Honor may be deemed to require
violent revenge, or sacrifice may be seen as sanctifying individuals or
groups. Would-be norm entrepreneurs need to grapple with this, and
recognize that simple assertions that peace is better than violence
often lack cultural salience. Truly creative efforts to promote human
rights and the rule of law may need to find ways to tap into the very
same sources of moral meaning that drive people to kill and to die for
causes human-rights advocates view with disapproval. Violence can be
powerfully compelling - but ethnographic and historical evidence
suggests that ideas of sacrifice can be equally compelling.2 3 Promoting
a culture of sacrifice may be the only effective way to counter a culture
that glorifies killing.
What this means concretely will vary from society to society. In
Kosovo, where conceptions of honor may drive some revenge killings,
I have already suggested that it might have been useful to appeal to
the ideas of sacrifice, hospitality, and charity that also lie at the heart
of most traditional Kosovar conceptions of honor.
E) Don't assume that law is always central to creating the rule
of law. Sometimes law matters, but sometimes it doesn't. A rush to
199. See Timothy Garton Ash, A Reality Show That's Riveting the World, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2000, at 29.
200. See Nurimitsu Omishi, Popular Uprising Ends Junta's Rule over Ivory Coast, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, at 1 (quoting an Ivoirian student saying, "The mistake [General] Guei
made was to let us watch scenes from Belgrade.").
201. When they are not, starting from scratch may be better - but even then, linking
the "new" to the successful old, even when the old has not existed for years, may be most
effective.
202. See Bernard Sanders, IMF "Salvation" In Russia?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June
25,1998, at 11.
203. Cf. BARBARA EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES (1997); RENE GIRARD, VIOLENCE
AND THE SACRED (1979).
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build up formal legal institutions may at times be inappropriate and
premature, even detrimental, as in Kosovo. This has obvious implica-
tions for what has come to be called "transitional justice," a phrase
that sounds broad in its application but is typically used narrowly to
refer to accountability mechanisms designed to address past human-
rights abuses."° In some societies, prosecutions of those who violated
human rights may have played a role in creating the rule of law. In
others, such as Rwanda, a rush to prosecute may have in fact under-
mined governmental efforts to stabilize society and regain public con-
fidence.2 5 At particular moments in particular societies, "nonlegal"
aspects of culture may protect human rights, reduce violent conflicts,
and promote order and predictability in social life far more effectively
than formal legal structures. Ultimately, nonlegal myths and stories,
customs and rituals, habits and assumptions, and patterns of inter-
action may be what enables the emergence of the rule of law.
F) Sometimes "make-believe" may work. Notwithstanding the last
paragraph, at times, norm entrepreneurs may be able to bring about
change simply by acting as if change has already occurred. This is
tricky, and for success a core group of people committed to acting "as
if" may be necessary. In South Africa, representatives from every
political party took part in televised discussions of what the
postapartheid constitution should look like, arguing passionately over
every clause. On the level of formalism, many of the debates mattered
little, since we all know that law in the books may have little or no
bearing on human rights and the rule of law in practice. But in a
nation where the law had been almost wholly discredited as an instru-
ment of racist oppression, the important message of these televised
discussions was that actors from all sides of the political spectrum
believed that the formal law was important. Here, the process itself
carried within it a revolutionary message: from now on, the written
constitution will guide and constrain us; from now on, South Africa
will be a nation which believes in the rule of law. Such Wizard-of-Oz-
style legerdemain may be difficult to pull off - but at times, it may
magically circumvent the chicken-and-egg problem of getting to the
rule of law in societies where formal law has been discredited.
G) Pick your battles, and recognize that true cultural change is
generally incremental. While rapid norm transformations (norm cas-
cades and norm bandwagons, to use Cass Sunstein's phrase)2"
sometimes occur, usually they do so only when many tiny individual
norm shifts have gone before. Trying to change every single thing at
204. See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
205. The gacaca system may not only dispose of cases quickly but do so in a way that is
experienced as more fair and stable. Cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 168, at 69-72 (discussing
some of the pitfalls of what he terms "corrective justice").
206. See Sunstein, supra note 155, at 909.
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once is likely to lead to backlash and failure, as the stories from
Kosovo suggest. The post-World War II allied occupations of
Germany and Japan may suggest - dispiritingly, for some human-
rights activists - that norm transformations were possible in part
because the Allies allowed many imperfect institutions and laws to
remain, and allowed many people to remain part of governing struc-
tures despite their complicity in abuses. (In both Germany and Japan,
many of the highest ranking and most visible Nazi and Imperial lead-
ers were ousted, and often tried, but middle- and lower-level people
who were equally complicit were generally left alone.)
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is a first step towards understanding why so many
well-intentioned international interventions to create "the rule of law"
have had disappointing results. It suggests that if we want to take
seriously issues of norm creation in international interventions, we
need to carve out a new area of study at the place where traditional
international-law inquiries intersect with the concerns of comparative
legal scholars and the concerns of domestic legal scholars. It also sug-
gests that before we will be able to intervene effectively to change the
degree and distribution of violence in conflict-ridden societies, we will
need to let go of some of our basic assumptions about the relationship
between law, order, and violence.
This implies something that may be disturbing to many human-
rights advocates: that both violence and suffering can be deeply
compelling to human beings. The human-rights discourse will have to
create alternative ways to conceptualize violence and suffering if it is
to capture people's hearts and minds, and to do so it may need to draw
on some of the very same traditions that give meaning to violence and
suffering in the first place. At times, formal law may be helpful in this
endeavor. At other times, it may be irrelevant or damaging. The trick
will be to tell the difference.
While this Article raises as many questions as it answers, the issues
it outlines are critically important for those of us who believe that
"law" is a valuable human invention. Ultimately, I hope the questions
raised here will enrich domestic efforts to understand how law affects
cultural change, as well as enriching international efforts to create
rule-of-law cultures.
It should go without saying that the project of intervening
in "other" cultures in order to change and "improve" them is a
fundamentally arrogant and imperialist project, with many pitfalls.
Nonetheless, I do not think it is a project we can abandon, since the
price of abandoning it is turning our backs upon immense human suf-
fering - and increasing our own vulnerability to acts of terrorism
fueled by hopelessness and rage. As the process of globalization
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continues, we have less and less basis for turning our backs upon the
suffering of others, whether they live in our town or country or on the
other side of the globe.
My prediction is that while it may never be possible to justify
interventions to promote human rights and the rule of law in a way
that will be satisfying to everyone, such interventions will continue to
seem like moral imperatives to many people. To others, such interven-
tions will seem imperative for international-security reasons, even if
not for moral reasons. And if we are going to engage in the risky
business of neoimperialist interventions to create new norms, we owe
it to ourselves and to the world to do it as self-consciously and effec-
tively as possible.
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